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Supreme Court Journalism: From Law
to Spectacle?
Barry Sullivan* and Cristina Carmody Tilley**
Abstract
Few people outside certain specialized sectors of the press and
the legal profession have any particular reason to read the
increasingly voluminous opinions through which the Justices of the
Supreme Court explain their interpretations of the Constitution and
laws. Most of what the public knows about the Supreme Court
necessarily comes from the press. That fact raises questions of
considerable importance to the functioning of our constitutional
democracy: How, for example, does the press describe the work of
the Supreme Court? And has the way in which the press describes
the work of the Court changed over the past several decades?
This Article seeks to address those questions by comparing the
print media coverage of two highly salient cases involving similar
legal issues decided fifty years apart. Our study suggests that, at
least in highly salient cases, the nature of print media coverage may
well have changed dramatically during that fifty-year interval.
More specifically, our study suggests that while the mid-twentieth
century press described the Court’s decisions largely in terms of the
legal questions presented, the contemporary press seems more likely
to describe the Court’s decisions in non-legal terms—as something
resembling a spectacle, in which unelected judges are presumed to
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decide cases, not on properly contested legal grounds, but based on
their respective political commitments.
That conclusion is striking. First, it suggests that in the
ongoing scholarly debate over the nature of the Justices’ approach
to their work, the press has chosen sides. Rather than closely
interrogating the Court’s work to determine whether particular
analyses and results can be defended on legal grounds,
contemporary reporting seems to proceed on the assumption that
that question lacks salience—because we already know that the
Justices’ political views and allegiances are the true drivers of
Supreme Court decisions. Thus, contemporary press coverage tends
to emphasize such factors as the political affiliation of the president
who appointed a particular Justice. Second, it raises questions
about the way in which the contemporary press is discharging its
responsibility to educate the public about the Court and its work. It
also raises the possibility that the public will become predisposed to
doubt the Court’s legitimacy, and, indeed, the very legitimacy of the
American system of judicial review.
If the Court’s decisions really reflect nothing more than the
Justices’ political predilections and commitments, or those of the
elites to which they belong, it is important for the public to know
that. Nothing could be more important than discovering and
documenting the fact that the Justices wear no clothes. On the other
hand, whether Supreme Court decisions deserve to be viewed in that
way is a question that needs to be tested through a careful
examination of the Court’s work product. It is something to be
proved rather than presumed. The contemporary print media’s
seemingly casual assumption that the main point about reporting
on the Supreme Court is not to test the validity of the Court’s
reasoning, and explore its flaws, but to try to trace connections
between the Justices’ voting behavior and their political or other
commitments, may well corrode public confidence in the Court. If
that occurs unnecessarily, and without adequate justification, the
consequences for the institution of judicial review may well be dire.
Moreover, if the public’s expectations are lowered, so too may be the
standards the Justices set for themselves and each other. In other
words, if the press leads us to believe that the Court’s work product
is nothing more than politics, that may well become a self-fulfilling
prophesy—if it has not already happened.
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Not surprisingly, social science research indicates that the
public prefers a Supreme Court that operates within the constraints
of legal doctrine to one that simply incarnates the Justices’ political
or other commitments. In fact, public willingness to accept the
Court’s decisions, and to protect its independence against
incursions by the political branches, has been linked to the public’s
recognition that the Court has a unique institutional role to play in
interpreting the Constitution and laws. When the public is
conditioned to believe that the proper way to think about the Court
is to assume that the Justices do politics first and law second,
however, the public will necessarily view the Court as redundant
and illegitimate, having usurped the legitimate authority of the
elected branches. Consequently, we conclude that the contemporary
press’s depictions of the Court as an institution unduly influenced
by politics may well undermine public confidence in the institution,
and also, perhaps, diminish the public’s faith in the Constitution
itself as a legitimate and effective basis for democratic government.
As other scholars have pointed out, extreme party polarization
has characterized the conduct of American politics in recent years.
While that fact initially had the greatest impact on the House of
Representatives, it has also increasingly affected both the workings
of the Senate and the relations among the political branches. In
recent years, the judicial confirmation process has become more
overtly and consistently partisan, with presidents and senators
consciously seeking to nominate and confirm (or defeat) candidates
who are thought to be most likely to affect the perceived political
balance of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court. The
dynamics of the selection process play out differently, of course,
depending on a particular president’s attitude towards the
judiciary and on whether the presidency and the Senate are firmly
in the hands of the same or different political parties. The Senate
has effectively altered the number of votes necessary to confirm all
judicial nominees, including those nominated for positions on the
Supreme Court, so that nominees may now be confirmed with the
barest of Senate majorities. In addition, senators of both parties (to
say nothing of various highly partisan and well-financed special
interest groups) have routinely engaged in something like trench
warfare to promote or defeat judicial nominees; and some nominees
have willingly undertaken the role of partisan warrior in their
confirmation hearings, knowing that their confirmations do not
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depend on bipartisan support. One recent presidential candidate
not only put the Supreme Court at the center of his election
campaign, he went so far as to publish a list of jurists from which
he pledged to fill a vacancy that his allies in the Senate had kept
open for him.
In these circumstances, there is much reason to question
whether the courts can and will apply the law in an even-handed
way. If politicians, the public, and the judges become conditioned
to think that there is no distinction worth making between law and
politics, this will undoubtedly become the case. It seems all the more
important, therefore, that the press should hold the courts
accountable, not giving in to the easy assumption that judges
necessarily base their decisions on their own extra-legal
commitments, but constantly testing the work of the courts to
determine whether their analyses and results are grounded in law.
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“Journalists are the managers of the political life of judicial
decisions.” 1
I. Introduction
This Article is divided into six parts. Part II, which follows this
introduction, briefly traces the history of our national community’s
collective thinking about the legitimacy and proper function of the
Supreme Court. It summarizes the longstanding expert debate
about how the Court should exercise its power of judicial review,
that is, the authority to invalidate laws that conflict with the
Constitution. For present purposes, we rely on descriptive theories
of judicial review that may be thought to fall into three broad
categories: the first posits that the Justices reach decisions by
1. FLORIAN SAUVAGEAU ET AL., THE LAST WORD: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 8 (2006) (quoting Peter Russell, Comments for Media
Supreme Court Research Workshop, Ottawa, Nov. 7, 2002).
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deductive reasoning; the second posits that they reach decisions by
acting on their own personal and political preferences; and the
third posits that they decide cases through the exercise of
“principled discretion.” 2 The first two categories are
self-explanatory. This third category is more complicated. It views
the Justices as neither proceeding deductively nor simply acting
on their own political preferences, but wrestling in good faith with
the many opaque or indeterminate questions involved in
constitutional litigation, choosing amongst various interpretive
archetypes, and necessarily exercising judgment as they reason
towards a conclusion. 3
Social science studies suggest that most Americans prefer this
third model of constitutional adjudication. 4 Those studies indicate
that the public prefers the Justices to be guided by constitutional
text and precedent, but also recognizes the need for them to
exercise individual judgment. 5 Further, according to social science
literature, Americans largely accept even decisional outcomes they
dislike so long as they believe them to be the product of reasoned
judgment. 6 When the public believes that the Court is guided by
legal principles—even when the Justices must exercise judgment
and discretion in the application of those principles—the public
supports the judiciary as a branch of government that should be
free from executive or legislative dominance. 7 The public shows no
similar tolerance for judicial decisions that they perceive to be the
product of unvarnished political will. 8 Thus, the public seems to
support the Court when it perceives that the Court is acting in a
purely legal fashion; tolerate it when the Justices exercise
2. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the descriptive theories of judicial
review.
3. See infra Part II.A.3.
4. See Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court and Myth: An Empirical
Investigation, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385, 391 (1974) (finding that two-thirds of
Americans believe the Court’s main job is to act as a “legal” institution functioning
based on “pure law”).
5. Id.
6. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment
of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 788 (1994) (finding that the public generally prefers
that “the law, not personal values and opinions, should drive outcomes”).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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judgment in legal decision-making, based in part on individual
judgment and values; and disapprove when the Court appears to
decide cases solely with a view to furthering external goals sought
by political organizations.
Part III shows that decisional narratives emphasized by the
press exert an outsized influence on the public’s understanding of
the Court’s work. How the press depicts the Justices’ reliance on
legal considerations versus political considerations is therefore
crucial. Previous studies have shown that press coverage of the
Court is now rife with political language, but one cannot fully
appreciate how press coverage may influence public confidence in
the Court without also inquiring into whether the press’s focus on
political framings has come at the expense of the public’s
understanding of the legal issues with which the Court deals. 9
Because the public seemingly accepts the proposition that the
Court will inevitably consider policy concerns when legal texts are
not dispositive (as will often be the case), reporting on non-legal
factors involved in the Court’s work is far from problematic in
itself. On the other hand, social science literature indicates that
public confidence in the Court will likely drop when the media
depict the Court in a way that suggests that it is eschewing legal
reasoning altogether in favor of naked political calculation. 10 It is
therefore essential that the press get it right. While researchers
have extensively documented public preferences for judicial
decision-making, and have studied the potential for media
narratives to inform the public about whether their preferences are
being met, there has been little examination of how the press
actually assigns weight to the legal and political drivers of the
Court’s work, and whether that assignment has changed over
time. 11 To assess how journalism about the Court might correlate
with diminished public confidence in the institution, it is necessary
to track the relative weight that journalists have given to “legal”
9. See infra Part III.
10. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Politicization of the United States
Supreme Court, 4 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 613, 621 (2014) (“The suggestion has
been that these politicizing references run the risk of damaging public support for
the Court and its work . . . .”).
11. See infra Part III.B.
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as opposed to “political” descriptions of judicial activity. This
Article attempts to do that.
Part IV reports on our efforts to fill the gap. We have sought
to investigate the question whether, over time, the popular print
media has shifted from a predominantly legal narrative of the
Court’s work to one that is at least equally concerned with political
considerations. Specifically, we studied media linguistics in two
high-impact civil rights cases, Brown v. Board of Education12 and
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 13 which were decided fifty years apart. Both cases required
the Court to determine the constitutionality of state or local laws
concerning the use of race in public school pupil assignments. 14
Scrutinizing newspaper coverage of these decisions showed what
appears to be a striking change in the characteristics of Supreme
Court reporting. 15 Coverage of the 1954 Brown case mainly
discussed constitutional text, precedent, and statutes as the
presumed drivers of judicial decision-making. 16 The final decision
in Brown was unanimous, of course, while the decision in Parents
Involved was not. On the other hand, Brown explicitly overruled a
longstanding precedent (which defined the legal, political, and
social life of a large part of the nation), while Parents Involved did
not. Throughout its coverage of Brown, the press gave little if any
attention to the individual Justices’ personal backgrounds or
political orientations, 17 and few third-party interest groups were
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
14. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 487–88 (stating the question presented as
whether the Constitution prohibited the segregation of students by race); Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 711 (stating the question presented as whether school
officials are categorically precluded from considering race in connection with
pupil assignments).
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part IV.B.1.
17. See infra Part IV.B.1 (contrasting press characterizations of the Court’s
decisions in Brown and Parents Involved). Although the ultimate decision in
Brown was unanimous, there was no reason to anticipate that fact while the case
was pending and the subject of pre-decisional reporting. The Brown Justices
(except for Chief Justice Warren, a Republican and Eisenhower appointee) were
all appointed by Democratic presidents, but they reflected the political and
geographical diversity of the Roosevelt Coalition. See generally WILLIAM
DOMNARSKI, THE GREAT JUSTICES 1941–54: BLACK, DOUGLAS, FRANKFURTER &
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asked to comment on the political implications of the case. 18 By
contrast, coverage of the 2007 Parents Involved case focused on the
political leanings and backgrounds of the Justices as important
drivers of the Court’s decision. In addition, from the grant of
certiorari to the announcement of the decision, third-party interest
groups were quoted at length, explaining the case in political
terms; the relevant legal texts received much less attention. 19 The
two cases were remarkably comparable in terms of the issue
presented and the kinds of legal argumentation the parties
employed. 20 Nevertheless, the mainstream media portrayed the
result in Brown as largely the product of law, 21 while fifty years
later they described the decision in Parents Involved as one owing
at least as much to political considerations. 22
Part V considers some possible ramifications of this altered
focus for maintaining public confidence in the institutional
integrity and legitimacy of the Court. Clearly, popular confidence
in the independence and integrity of the courts facilitates the
litigants’ compliance with judicial orders in individual
JACKSON IN CHAMBERS (2006); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 424–33 (1960) (discussing the Roosevelt
Coalition); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX 246–88
(1956) (same). In Parents Involved, only two Justices (Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer) were Democratic appointees. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2007) (noting President Clinton’s
appointment of Ginsburg and Breyer). In recent years, critics have often
commented on the Court’s socio-educational homogeneity. See Natasha Bach, One
Thing Trump Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Won’t Change Is the Supreme Court’s
Harvard-Yale Monopoly, FORTUNE (July 10, 2018) https://perma.cc/DQ4T-NZFT
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (“Nine of the . . . Justices, including outgoing Justice
Kennedy, received their law degree from an Ivy League school. Five . . . went to
Harvard, three to Yale, and Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard
before . . . graduating from Columbia Law School.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
18. See infra Part IV.B-C.
19. See infra Part IV.B-C.
20. See infra Part IV.A.
21. Ironically, the Brown Court was strongly criticized not only by
segregationists, but by many academic lawyers and jurists, for having
overstepped proper judicial bounds. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 54–55 (1958) (critiquing the Court’s
performance in Brown); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (1959) (same).
22. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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cases—which is obviously critical to the proper functioning of the
judicial system. 23 But public confidence in the courts is also
important for reasons that radiate beyond individual cases. If the
public believes that the Court’s decisions are mainly the product of
politics, those decisions will necessarily lack both legitimacy and
long-term predictive value; their continued validity will largely
depend on whatever the current composition of the Court is.
Decisions will soon be understood as something like “restricted
railway ticket[s], good for this day and train only.” 24 In that case,
the public may justifiably come to believe that the content of
constitutional law depends on nothing more than presidential
elections and the appointments, retirements, and deaths of the
Justices. 25 This perception may ultimately erode the public’s faith,
not only in the Court and the Constitution, but in the very notion
of the rule of law as a normative principle undergirding the nation
itself. Not insignificantly, it may also affect the ways in which
future Justices (and lower court judges) view the nature of the
Court’s work and their own responsibilities as judges. 26 It will
certainly affect the attitude of presidents and senators as they
contemplate the nomination and confirmation processes. 27 Finally,
Part VI closes the Article with some concluding observations.

23. See infra Part V.
24. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Justice Roberts added: “I have no assurance, in view of current decisions, that the
opinion announced today may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by justices
who deem they have new light on the subject.” Id.
25. See Christine Kexel Chabot, Do Justices Time Their Retirements
Politically? An Empirical Analysis of the Timing and Outcomes of Supreme Court
Retirements in the Modern Era, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 527, 575 (2019) (discussing the
timing of retirements from the Court and concluding that “political timing has
played only a limited role in Justices’ retirement decisions in the modern era”).
26. See TOOBIN, supra note 17, at 207–08 (describing Justice Souter’s alleged
perception of the majority’s decision in Bush v. Gore as “so transparently, so
crudely partisan that [he] thought he might not be able to serve with them
anymore”).
27. See infra Part V.
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II. The Public and the Court
A. The Constitution, the Court, and the Process of Interpretation
Under the American system of judicial review, “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.” 28 The Supreme Court has the last word
therefore—at least normally and as a formal matter—when it
comes to ascertaining the meaning and proper application of the
Constitution, the constitutionality of federal statutes and
regulations, and the constitutionality of federal executive action. 29
The Court also has the last word concerning the constitutionality
of state laws and administrative practices—an arrangement that
is essential to ensuring the supremacy of federal law, but one that
often has caused friction between the national and state
governments. 30 The Supreme Court is not the only authoritative
28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“A
constitution . . . must be regarded by the judges as a fundamental law . . . . [T]he
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to
the intention of their agents.”).
29. The enforcement of judgments depends mainly on voluntary compliance,
but the coercive power of the executive branch is sometimes required. See, e.g.,
Clifford J. Carrubba & Christopher Zorn, Executive Discretion, Judicial
Decision-Making, and Separation of Powers in the United States, 72 J. POL. 812,
812 (2010) (“Ever since Hamilton’s famous observation that the . . . Court has
neither the power of the ‘purse nor the sword,’ scholars have recognized that the
courts . . . must rely upon other actors to ensure that their decisions are
followed.”); United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 109 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Fifth Circuit’s orders requiring desegregation of
the University of Mississippi were enforced only because President Kennedy
deployed more federal forces to Oxford, Mississippi than George Washington had
ever commanded at one time during the American War of Independence); see also
PAUL J. SCHEIPS, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS,
1945–1992, at 69–136 (2005) (discussing deployment of federal troops to Oxford,
Mississippi). Congress may overrule the Court on non-constitutional questions
and frequently does so. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1320 (2014) (describing instances in which
Congress legislates to effectively overrule the Supreme Court).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing that under the U.S.
Constitution, treaties and laws made pursuant to the Constitution shall be “the
supreme law of the land”); see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 200
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interpreter of the Constitution and laws, or even in some ways the
most important; 31 but it does have the last word—at least when
the resolution of constitutional questions is necessary to the
decision of an actual controversy that the Court has deemed
justiciable and worthy of its attention. 32 That much is clear. Of
course, the constitutional text does not expressly provide for
judicial review. 33 The courts’ power to review governmental action
for constitutionality is nonetheless settled because the Court so
held in Marbury v. Madison, 34 and, as the Court said with some
(1796) (invalidating a Virginia statute as being inconsistent with the Treaty of
Paris); John Minor Wisdom, The Frictionmaking, Exacerbating Political Role of
Federal Courts, 21 SW. L.J. 411, 412 (1967) (discussing the tensions between state
and federal authorities that federal court decisions sometimes cause).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 684, 703 (1974) (Burger, C.J.)
(“[E]ach branch . . . must initially interpret the Constitution, and the
interpretation
of
its
powers . . . is
due
respect
from
the
others . . . . [H]owever . . . ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.’” (citation omitted)). The Court’s
output is miniscule, compared not only to that of other state and federal courts,
but also to that of executive branch lawyers, whose constitutional advice only
rarely results in litigation. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 56 (2008).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (outlining the role and jurisdiction of the
federal courts); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (holding that the Court
is bound to decide cases properly before it, even those it “would gladly avoid”). But
the Court has created several limitations on federal jurisdiction, and the Court’s
current statutory jurisdiction is almost entirely discretionary. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 42 (7th ed. 2016) (outlining several limits
on federal court jurisdiction); Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in
Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, October Terms
1958– 60 and 2010–12, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1005, 1006 (2015) (describing the
Court’s current statutory jurisdiction as almost entirely discretionary).
33. Although the constitutional text does not specifically authorize the Court
to invalidate legislation, Federalist 78 so contemplates, see THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, supra note 28, at 525, and the Court assumed that to be the case as early as
1796. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 172 (1796) (assuming the existence
of a power to declare legislation unconstitutional).
34. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). That task is complicated by the fact that the
Constitution is “one of enumeration, and not of definition,” as Chief Justice
Marshall said in Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. 1, 72 (1824). “[T]he extent of the
powers actually granted . . . will probably continue to arise, as long as our system
shall exist.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). As Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted in United States v. Lopez, “[t]he Constitution mandates this
uncertainty [concerning the extent of the commerce power] by withholding from
Congress a plenary police power that would authorize the enactment of every type
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degree of exaggeration 150 years later, “that principle has ever
since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.” 35 As a
practical matter, few would now doubt that judicial review for
constitutionality is a fundamental part of our law. 36
Less clear to many people is what the Supreme Court actually
does—or should do—when it reviews the constitutionality of
legislative or executive action and thereby discharges its duty “to
say what the law is.” 37 The Constitution does not expressly say
what the Court should do, and even what the Court does in practice
has long been contested. Over time, three archetypal models of
judicial review have developed. The first is a “pure legal” model, in
which judges are said to reason deductively from legal texts. The
second is a “pure political” model, in which judges are thought to
reach policy outcomes without feeling bound by legal texts. The
third is an intermediate model, in which judges take seriously the
commands of legal texts but necessarily make individual
interpretive and consequentialist judgments when giving specific
meaning to those texts in concrete circumstances. Although these
models are somewhat over-simplified, they are nonetheless useful
for present purposes. Of the three models, we think that the
intermediate model, which we dub “principled discretion,” best
captures both the ideal of the judicial task and the method that
most judges probably follow in actually deciding cases. 38 Most
of legislation.” 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
35. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The Court’s assertion has often
been criticized as self-aggrandizing and inaccurate. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen,
Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines
Constitutional Meaning? 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 106 (2004) (reciting
criticism).
36. Of course, not everyone thinks that judicial review is a good idea. See,
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism, 2004 ILL. L. REV. 673, 674 (2004). On a broader stage,
commentators have suggested that other forms of judicial review may be
preferable to the American form. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The New
Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 708 (2001)
(suggesting that other forms of judicial review, particularly those used in Canada
and other Commonwealth countries, may be preferable to the American model).
37. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
38. Indeed, the “principled discretion” model may well describe the only way
in which judges actually can decide cases. Joseph Vining has made this point in
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important, at least for present purposes, we think that this model
best reflects what the public believes that the Court does and
should do. A brief description and discussion of the three models
follows.
1. The “Pure Legal” Model
An early, formalist understanding of the judicial role posited
that judges simply find or deduce law by applying preexisting rules
and taxonomies to the specifics of a case to generate “correct
answers.” 39 For example, Justice Owen Roberts once suggested
that the Court’s “only one duty” in determining the
constitutionality of a statute is “to lay the article of
the Constitution . . . beside the statute . . . and decide whether the
latter squares with the former.” 40 That model continues to exert
a compelling way:
In fact, lawyers are notoriously misleading when they talk about law.
They speak—we speak—constantly of rules, borrowing the language of
physics, rules that carry with them a vision of discrete entities that can
be manipulated logically, definitions that capture the phenomena they
define, and intellectually coercive demonstration, from which the
dissenter can escape only by accepting his own irrationality. Lawyers
speak the language of rules, but when they engage in law and are
observed to engage in law, their rules are nowhere to be found. There
is only a vast surround of legal texts, from which they draw in coming
to a responsible decision, what to do, what to advise, what to order,
which responsible decision of their own they may cast in the form of a
rule, just before it takes its place among competing statements in the
great surround of texts upon which other lawyers are drawing.
Joseph Vining, Theorists’ Belief: A Comment on the Moral Tradition of American
Constitutionalism, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 15, 23 (1996).
39. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 26 (2002).
40. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1936). According to Richard
Fallon,
[C]ourts [sometimes] assert that value choices are never for them to
make but are solely the domain of the political branches. However,
protestations of this kind are simply not credible. Indeed, [such
protestations may] signal that the court is about to implement a value
choice so controversial that denial is easier than explanation.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (1987). Indeed, as Professor Fallon
notes, “[t]he essence of good judging lies in judgment.” Id. at 1223; see also Barry
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some hold on the public imagination, in part, no doubt, because
Supreme Court nominees routinely stress the straightforward
nature of the work that the Justices do. 41 Chief Justice John
Roberts famously observed at his confirmation hearing that legal
interpretation is analogous to an umpire’s work in calling balls and
strikes, 42 and, although Justice Elena Kagan offered somewhat
more nuanced testimony at her confirmation hearing, she
Sullivan, Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle and the Moral Life of
Judges, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 366–70 (2016) [hereinafter Sullivan, Listening]
(discussing decisional process). Justice Scalia observed that an “originalist”
interpretation of the Constitution was desirable, not because it obviated the need
for judgment, but because it required fewer judgments. See Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 856–57 (1989).
41. They undoubtedly do so in recognition of the awesome power inherent in
the Court’s duty to determine the constitutionality of legislation. See James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 135 (1893) (arguing that courts should afford legislation a
strong presumption of constitutionality and invalidate legislative enactments
only when they are shown to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt).
42. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 56 (2005). The metaphor may be inapposite in any event. See Jim
Evans, Sorry, Judges, We Umpires Do More Than Call Balls and Strikes: Calling
A Game Requires Plenty of Interpretation, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/X8M6-CSP5 (last visited October 20, 2019) (detailing a
professional umpire’s critique of umpiring as metaphor for judging) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 37 (1989) (suggesting that judges
may be “like [the] baseball umpire [who says] . . . ‘[t]here’s balls and there’s
strikes and they ain’t nothin’ till I calls ‘em’”). Morton Horwitz has reflected on
the emergence of textualism and the disavowal of discretion:
A return to the traditional conservative emphasis on stare decisis
hardly seemed sufficient, because the prevailing precedents were
precisely what needed to be overthrown . . . . There thus began a
search for some more fundamental source of authority that would
permit a new majority to overturn the Warren Court precedents
without itself being considered illegitimately “political.”
Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitutionality of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 35 (1993); see
also Barry Sullivan, The Power of Imagination: Diversity and the Education of
Lawyers and Judges, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1105, 1142 (2018) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Power] (“What they actually mean to affirm is that the law is certain,
and that absolutely correct answers to legal questions can be found through
reason and logic. On this view, there is no need for interpretation, and the
character, life experience, judgment, and imagination of the judge are
irrelevant.”).
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emphasized that interpretation involves “law all the way down.” 43
While that statement may well be true in some respects, depending
on one’s understanding of “law,” it may also send a false or
misleading message about legal certainty to lay people. 44
Despite these public statements, belief in “mechanical
jurisprudence” declined during the twentieth century. 45 The
“scientific” approach to law celebrated in the late nineteenth
century46 gave way to a greater understanding that judges often
have an opportunity to take policy considerations into account. 47
During this period, many scholars derided a “pure legal” approach
to judging as impossible to execute and unlikely to yield “workable
43. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8, 103 (2010) (Testimony of Elena Kagan). In response to
questions from Senator Kyl, Justice Kagan answered:
I think it’s law all the way down. When . . . parties come before the
Court, the question is not do you like this party or do you like that
party, do you favor this cause or do you favor that cause. The question
is . . . what the law requires. Now, there are cases in which it is difficult
to determine what the law requires. Judging is not . . . robotic . . . . A
lot of [cases that get to the Court] are very difficult and people can
disagree . . . . But it’s law all the way down, regardless . . . . [W]hat the
judge does is to apply the law. And as I said, it might be hard
sometimes to figure out what the law requires in any given case, but
it’s all the way down.
44. See MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS
COURT 8 (2013) (suggesting that Kagan “was making a subtle and pretty deep
point: Law all the way down involves the exercise of judicial judgment”); see also
LLOYD WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 50–51
(2d ed. 2016) (“A . . . distinctive feature of adjudication is that the court’s decision
is to be based entirely on the law . . . . [N]o one doubts that a court is to look to
those sources and nowhere else.”); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 44–45 (1999) (“No matter how much legal
scholars question the distinction [between applying the law and making new law],
the rule of law as a social practice is bound to it. We can imagine a policy science
that is wholly unbounded by the past, but it is not law’s rule.”).
45. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 16–19 (1992).
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Barry Sullivan, The United States Supreme Court: Empirical
Studies and the Case of Oral Submissions, Lecture Given for an Invitation of the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Warsaw, 27.10.2015, at 72:12, in PANSTWO I
PRAWO at 110 (2017) (discussing the opportunity that judges have to consider
policy implications when making decisions).
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and just result[s].” 48 Notably, the “legal model” that was debunked
in the mid-twentieth century was something of a
caricature— positing a transparent constitutional text from which
deductively ascertainable results automatically flow. 49 A more
realistic account of the “legal model” would acknowledge that
judges are not reasoning deductively, but drawing on an array of
sources including the most salient facts, the text of the applicable
constitutional provision, original meaning, and case law to shape
outcomes. 50 Nevertheless, the essential characteristic of the “legal
model” of judging posits that the production of opinions involves
only considerations internal to the law, narrowly defined, and even
the most moderate understanding of this description of judging is
thought by many to be unrealistic. 51
2. The “Pure Political” Model
Many twentieth century critics began to call the legal model a
“myth,” incapable of explaining, let alone predicting, case
outcomes. 52 They claimed that the so-called “attitudinal” approach,
which presumes that judges decide cases based on factors external
to law, provides a better basis for understanding the Court’s
work. 53
The “attitudinalist” model contends that courts are not
effectively constrained by law; that their decisions reflect personal
preferences; and that, at least at the Supreme Court level, judges
48. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 622
(1908).
49. See HORWITZ, supra note 45, at 18 (“While judges and lawyers of the
nineteenth century clearly believed that there were identifiable bright-line
boundaries . . . it is all too easy to caricature their position.”).
50. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 39, at 388 (describing the new approach
to the legal model). But that model would seem to be indistinguishable in fact
from the “principled discretion” model.
51. See id. at 26 (describing the legal model as one that posits the existence
of certain “correct answers” that result from the application of clear legal rules).
52. See John M. Scheb & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public
Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 928, 929 (2000) [hereinafter
Scheb & Lyons I] (describing the legal model as a “myth”).
53. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 39, at 88–97 (describing criticisms of the
legal model).
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“can . . . usually rule for either party within the boundaries of what
most people would agree is reasonable judicial decision-making.” 54
Because law is infinitely malleable, judges are freed to follow
political intuition without showing that they have disregarded
law. 55 On this view, the Justices’ opinions are mainly the product
of a pre-existing “interrelated set of beliefs about . . . the [types of]
parties to the suit [and] the dominant legal issue[s].” 56 Some
scholars also claim that judicial decisions are better explained by
judicial “ideology” and judicial outcome bargaining than by

54. ERIC SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 6 (2018).
55. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 39, at 88–97 (describing the appeal the
attitudinalist approach has garnered among judges).
56. Id. at 86, 89–91. The attitudinalists assume that the Justices’ preexisting
beliefs about how certain litigants and issues should be treated can be
“ideologically scaled.” Id. Thus, the explanation for various Justices’ votes in a
given case arises not from complicated legal doctrines, but from the “simple” fact
that some Justices are “extremely conservative,” while others are “extremely
liberal.” Id. Thus, when a Justice is identified as “conservative,” that is not
because the Justice is an “originalist” or “textualist,” but because the Justice votes
for case outcomes that align with “conservative” political preferences. Id. More
recently, Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum have suggested the importance of the
Justices’ respective “social identities,” which “lead them to seek approval and
respect from individuals and groups that are important to them.” NEAL DEVINS &
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO
THE SUPREME COURT 147 (2019). In the case of the Justices, those individuals and
groups whose respect they esteem are the elites to which the Justices belong, and
to which they owe their positions. Id. at 148. According to Devins and Baum, “the
strongest sources of influence on the Justices from outside the Court are the
various elites with which the Justices are connected . . . . For this reason, the
state of opinion among relevant elites at a given time can shape decision making
by the Justices.” Id. Devins and Baum point to the increased political polarization
among elites, suggesting that this increased polarization has had an effect, for
various reasons, on both the selection and the performance of the Justices.
To a considerable degree, Supreme Court Justices have become part of
this new polarized world. Justices increasingly come to the Court with
strong ties to conservative or liberal elites, ties that they maintain as
Justices . . . . Justices are like other Americans in that the circles of
friends and acquaintances around them are more likely to have
homogeneous ideological orientations than was true in prior eras. As a
result, Justices are reinforced in the ideological tendencies that they
bring to the Court [and] the ideological content of Justices’ votes and
opinions is less susceptible to change than it was in the preceding
period.
Id. at 151.
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reference to legal texts or interpretive methodologies. 57 Thus, legal
rules are incapable of explaining or predicting actual case
outcomes. 58
In this vein, two leading political scientists confidently
declared in 2002 that the Justices’ votes could be very simply
explained: “Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is
extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he
was extremely liberal.” 59 According to these political scientists, it
is puerile to think that judges actually treat legal questions
seriously as legal questions, at least in salient cases; they decide
cases according to their personal or political commitments and
then dress up their decisions in legal language after the fact. 60
Although the attitudinalist approach has gained ground in
many quarters, 61 it arguably oversimplifies the Court’s work as
much as the “pure legal” or mechanical model did. 62 The
57. See, e.g., PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 6 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2002)
(asserting that judicial decisions are better explained by judicial ideology).
Indeed, Supreme Court expert Gregory Caldeira has said that no political
scientist “would take plain meaning, intent of the framers, [or] precedent as good
explanations of what the justices do in making decisions.” John M. Scheb &
William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular Expectations
Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV.
181, 182 (2001) [hereinafter Scheb & Lyons II] (quoting Gregory Caldeira, Review:
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 3 L. & POL. BOOK REV. 98, 98–100
(1993) (book review)).
58. See Scheb & Lyons I, supra note 52, at 929 (contending that ideology
explains judges’ decisions much more than legal rules).
59. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 39, at 86.
60. Some political scientists maintain that the Justices are merely “dressing
their actions in . . . legalistic trappings” when they explain their decisions in those
terms. See RORIE SPILL SOLBERG & ERIC N. WALTENBURG, THE MEDIA, THE COURT,
AND THE MISREPRESENTATION: THE NEW MYTH OF THE COURT 2 (2014) (citing LEE
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 8 (1998)). But others have
begun to acknowledge that judges are not pure politicians any more than they are
pure legal technicians: “[M]ost scholars recogniz[e] that judging at the level of the
Supreme Court involves a complicated blend of legal, policy, and ideological
considerations.” James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism
Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC. REV. 195, 198
n.7 (2011). Still, they suggest that this complexity eludes “the vast majority of the
American people,” who “hold simplified views of judging, views that can be
adequately captured by a rough continuum bounded by [mechanical
jurisprudence] on one end and realism on the other.” Id. at 196.
61. See Caldeira, supra note 57, at 98–100.
62. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and
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attitudinalists are certainly right to note that text, precedent, and
original intent will not lead ineluctably to undeniably “correct”
results in very many cases. 63 But they have been less effective in
describing the factors that do lead judges to decide cases as they
do. For example, some scholars have pointed out that the
ostensibly crucial determinants of judicial decision-making in the
attitudinal model—values, attitudes, policy preferences, and
ideology—have not been fully defined or theorized. 64 Nor is it clear
whether “values,” “policy preferences,” and “ideology” are
rhetorical variants meant to describe the same concept, or distinct
influences that can be measured separately. 65
Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 82 (2010) (arguing that the
attitudinal model and its “rational choice” variant “at best ignore and at worst
reject any role for law in Supreme Court judging” and presume that “the
ideological nature of each case can be characterized along a single
liberal-conservative dimension”). That assumption is highly questionable, as
demonstrated, for example, by the alignment of Justices Stevens and Scalia in
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress’ Commerce Clause
authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana
in compliance with California law); id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring) (writing
separately but concurring in the judgment).
63. See Sullivan, Power, supra note 42, at 1141 (“[W]e yearn for a world in
which law is certain and transparent and unencumbered by the need for
interpretation. While that is not our world, it seems to give us comfort to think it
is.”); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
OF LAW 97 (1985)
It is not a defect but a merit of our system that judges are
acknowledged to have discretion, that legal questions are seen as open
and difficult . . . . It is the aim of our law not to obliterate individual
judicial judgments . . . but to structure and discipline them, to render
them public and accountable.
See also Thomas S. Morawetz, The Epistemology of Judging: Wittgenstein and
Deliberative Practices, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 35, 59 (1990) (noting that judges “are
constrained individually by a particular way of addressing and understanding
interpretive questions and they are constrained collectively by the fact the shared
practice embraces a limited range of ways of proceeding,” which “is mutually
understood and recognized”).
64. See, e.g., Joshua Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology,
and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 136 (2009)
(“[S]cholars use the term ‘judicial ideology’ in the absence of any widespread
agreement or clear understanding as to what the term means in the first place.”).
65. See Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40
AM. J. POL. SCI. 261, 261–65 (1996) (discussing the various methods that scholars
use in attempting to measure the political preferences of judges).
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The
difficulty
of
defining
one
of
these
concepts— ideology—illustrates the problem. Indeed, as John
Gerring has noted, “it has become customary to begin any
discussion of ideology with some observation concerning its
semantic promiscuity.” 66 In the field of judicial review, “ideology”
could be understood to describe purely exogenous considerations
such as a judge’s partisan affiliation or her issue outcome
preferences. 67 On the other hand, it could be understood to describe
her preferred interpretive methodology, which some would
consider endogenous to law, while others would describe it as
exogenous. 68 This definitional ambiguity also complicates the
search for a workable method for measuring the influence of
ideology on judicial behavior. 69 If ideology were defined in terms of
factors exogenous to the legal process, for example, 70 those factors
presumably could be identified and measured by examining
markers such as the Justices’ political statements, involvement in
party politics, or advocacy of particular political positions in their
pre-judicial careers. 71 If ideology were defined in terms of factors
endogenous to the legal process, such as commitment to various
interpretive schools, that factor could also be identified and
66. John Gerring, Ideology: A Definitional Analysis, 50 POL. RES. Q. 957, 957
(1997).
67. See id. at 958 tbl. 1 (“We may speak of an individual’s total ideology or of
his ideology with respect to different areas of social life; politics, economics,
religion, minority groups, and so forth.” (quoting THEODOR ADORNO ET AL., THE
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 2 (1950))).
68. See id. (“[Ideology is t]he reflection of process and structure in the
consciousness of those involved—the product—of action.” (quoting Herbert
McClosky et al., Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 361, 362 (1964))).
69. See Fischman & Law, supra note 64, at 159 (stating that before deciding
on an approach for measuring judicial ideology, one must first “arrive at a
substantively satisfying definition of ideology”).
70. The choice of interpretive technique problem demonstrates the
fundamental nature of the definitional issue. An attitudinalist might consider a
Justice’s choice of interpretive technique as a marker of exogenous ideology, but
others would view that choice as necessary and wholly endogenous to the process
of legal interpretation. See infra notes 95–112 and accompanying text.
71. See Epstein & Mershon, supra note 65, at 263–65 (listing the various
approaches that scholars have used to measure political preferences, including
extracting values from pre-nomination speeches).
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measured. 72 But the scholarship generally does not identify which
of these factors is indicative of “ideology,” and it does not suggest a
method for weighing them. 73 Instead, the discipline has widely
adopted what can only be characterized as a blunt instrument: a
measurement
scheme
based
on
confirmation-stage
characterizations of the Justices as “conservative” or “liberal” in
the editorial pages of four national newspapers. 74 This
measurement scheme generates a “score” for each Justice, by
which his or her “ideology” can be compared with that of his or her
colleagues. 75
72. See, e.g., Amy C. Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement,
91 TEX. L. REV. 1711 (2012–2013) (discussing commitment to precedent).
73. Although difficult to classify as purely legal or purely political, weight
might also be given to factors such as the Justice’s geographic, cultural and
professional background, his or her personal values, or his or her understandings
of professional values and standards. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Recalibrating
Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 166–74 (2003) (“A number
of studies have shown a significant association between judicial voting patterns
and certain personal or professional background factors . . . .”). Attitudinalists
wishing to debunk the extreme legal in favor of the extreme political sometimes
overlook the elusive role of “personal judgment.” See, e.g., Fischman & Law, supra
note 64, at 141 (acknowledging that law and politics need not be mutually
exclusive and that judges have freely admitted a role for personal discretion and
judgment). In fact, some have rejected outright the view that judging can be
non-mechanical and still involve a good-faith effort to give relevant contemporary
meaning to the constitutional text and jurisprudence. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 39, at 52 (rejecting attitudinalist Herman Pritchett’s late-in-life
conclusion that the political model had gone awry when it ignored the possibility
that judges used personal calibrations to balance legal and political
considerations).
74. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 39, at 204 (“To determine perceptions of
a nominee’s qualifications and judicial philosophy, we use a content analysis from
statements in newspaper editorials from the time of the nomination until the
Senate voted.”). The newspapers are the “liberal” New York Times and
Washington Post and the “conservative” Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times.
Id.
75. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989). Notably,
Segal and Cover acknowledged that editorial writers are imperfectly positioned
to measure such things as judicial philosophy and partisanship, that they are
likely to be most interested in a nominee’s positions on civil liberties issues, and
that their scores likely reflect attitudes on matters relevant to only a limited
portion of the Court’s docket. See Epstein & Mershon, supra note 65, at 263–65
(“Segal and Cover explicitly recognized that their measures are not broad-gauged
surrogates for all attitudes but supply a reasonable evaluation of preferences over
civil liberties and rights issues.”). Notwithstanding these limitations, their
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In reality, the simplest and most extreme versions of both the
legal and political models fail to fully explain judicial behavior. But
both are grounded in accurate observations about judicial practice.
As we explain below, the legalists’ claim that judges genuinely
honor the authority of relevant texts has merit, but so does the
attitudinalists’ claim that judges often exercise individual
judgment when dealing with vague words or phrases. Expecting
either model to fully capture the dynamics of responsible judging
is somewhat unrealistic. 76 A “principled discretion” model of
judicial review, in contrast, acknowledges that successful judging
cannot wholly reject dynamics outside the law any more than it
can reject internal dynamics.
3. The “Principled Discretion” Model
Many Americans undoubtedly think of constitutional
interpretation as simple and straightforward, even mechanical,
and they may well suppose that any difference of opinion among
the Justices must be the result of judicial incompetence or bad
faith, adherence to political commitments, or personal bias. 77 That
is hardly surprising. Many of the Justices’ opinions employ a
method is the most widely used measure of judicial ideology. A more recent
method, the so-called Martin Quinn index, simply tracks individual Justice votes
over time to show patterns of coalition and disagreement without specifically
attempting to score the Justices ideologically. See Ward Farnsworth, The Use and
Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, with Special
Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143,
144 (2007) (“The method does not pay attention to what the case was about; the
method itself has nothing to do with politics or ideology (or, for that matter,
law).”). This derivation of “ideology” is especially circular for purposes of
measuring the extent to which the press depicts the Court as political in its news
pages, given that the same publication predicting a Justice’s ideology before he
takes the bench then has the opportunity to confirm that prediction when it
depicts his work on cases.
76. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 8 (1982) (“My typology of constitutional arguments is not . . . the
only plausible division of constitutional arguments. The various arguments
illustrated often work in combination.”).
77. See, e.g., Scheb & Lyons II, supra note 57, at 185 tbl. 1 (reporting that
85.1% of people surveyed believed that ideology impacted Supreme Court
decisions, while 69.9% believed that partisanship did).
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rhetoric of certainty, strongly suggesting that no reasonable
person could have reached a different conclusion. 78 Seldom does
one now encounter the kind of honest admission—that the problem
is indeed a difficult one—that Justice Jackson famously made in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 79 In addition, most
students of constitutional law would doubtless agree with Justice
Owen Roberts that the normal first step in determining the
constitutionality of a statute would be to lay the two texts
side-by-side, but few would describe the entire process of
constitutional interpretation in that way. 80 Indeed, the Court often
considers the constitutional text in great detail, even if it
sometimes gives short shrift to seemingly relevant constitutional
language. 81
78. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Failure to Communicate, 2012 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1705, 1715 (2012)
In dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia describes the majority’s
approaches as “nothing short of ludicrous” and “beyond the absurd,”
“entirely irrational,” and not “pass[ing] the most gullible scrutiny.” He
has declared that a majority opinion is “nothing short of preposterous”
and “has no foundation in American constitutional law, and barely
pretends to.” He talks about how “one must grieve for the Constitution”
because of a majority’s approach. He calls the approaches taken in
majority opinions “preposterous,” and “so unsupported in reason and
so absurd in application [as] unlikely to survive.” He speaks of how a
majority opinion “vandaliz[es] . . . our people’s traditions.”
See also Richard L. Hasen, The Most Sarcastic Justice, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 215
(2015).
79. 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
Just what our forefathers did envision [with respect to executive
power], or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions,
must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half
of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net
result. . . . And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial
practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way.
80. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 40, at 1244 (noting that arguments from text
are entitled to the greatest weight, but seldom unambiguously point to a single
result).
81. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (criticizing the Court
in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), for being “more swayed by a close
observance of the letter of the Constitution, without regard to former experience
and usage”); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100–02 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (advancing original meaning interpretation of Eleventh
Amendment); SEGALL, supra note 54, at 134
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In some cases, the founders used words that are open-ended
and sufficient to convey a general idea or principle, without
necessarily commanding a particular result. In National Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 82 for example, Justice
Frankfurter pointed to “the imprecision of . . . many . . . provisions
of the Constitution dealing with . . . vital aspects of government,” 83
a feature that he did not think the result of “chance or
ineptitude.” 84 On the contrary,
[g]reat concepts like “[c]ommerce . . . among the several States,”
“due process of law,” “liberty,” “property” were purposely left to
gather meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole
domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who
founded the Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society
remains unchanged. 85

In this respect, the law of the Constitution necessarily changes, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in United States v.
Morrison, 86 when he observed that “our interpretation of the
Commerce Clause has changed as the nation has developed.” 87 In
[Justice Souter, t]he only Justice . . . who ever [analyzed] the original
meaning of the text [in detail,] . . . persuasively demonstrated that
there is no evidence [that those] who ratified the Eleventh Amendment
would have interpreted it to block federal question lawsuits against
states brought by [its] citizens . . . .
In addition, in the case of heavily litigated provisions, the disputed issue may
focus on the proper reading of prior jurisprudence to the point that the underlying
textual provision receives little or no specific attention. See, e.g., Brittany
Boatman, United States v. Jones: The Foolish Revival of the “Trespass Doctrine”
in Addressing GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 47 VAL. U. L. REV.
677, 681–83 (2013) (discussing the dominance of jurisprudence in Fourth
Amendment analysis).
82. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
83. Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.)
Due process of law . . . conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow
requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights
which the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free
society. . . . The real clue . . . is not to ask where the line is once and for
all to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the
gradual and empiric process of “inclusion and exclusion.”
86. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
87. Id. at 607.
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addition, the constitutional text is far from single-minded or
univocal. 88 For example, the Constitution seeks to ensure security
while also promoting liberty, and to ensure energy in the executive
while also investing Congress with the resources necessary to
resist executive tyranny. 89 Insofar as individual rights are
concerned, the Constitution purports to protect numerous
interests and values that often conflict in practice. 90 The
circumstances of any particular case may therefore require the
courts to prioritize individually recognized interests and values,
but the text of the Constitution offers no certain hierarchy for
doing so. 91
88. See BOBBITT, supra note 76, at 12 (“[E]ven in the brief records we do have
[of the Constitutional Convention], we encounter the phenomenon of delegates
urging the adoption of the same language for disconsonant purposes.”).
89. Of course, specific rights are protected both in the text of the original
Constitution and in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (habeas
corpus); id. art. III, § 3 (proof of treason requirements); id. amend. IV (freedom
from unreasonable searches); id. amend. V (due process of law). In addition, many
of the framers thought that the very structure of the Constitution, particularly
those provisions meant to give effect to the concepts of federalism and the
separation of powers, were sufficient to protect individual liberty, and that no bill
of rights was therefore necessary. Thus, Hamilton wrote in Federalist 84: “The
truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the constitution is itself
in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 581 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). In his
view, the Constitution, “founded upon the power of the people, and executed by
their immediate representatives and servants,” is “a better recognition of popular
rights than volumes of those aphorisms” that are found in bills of rights. Id. at
578–79. See also U.S. CONST. art. I–III; id. amend. X (establishing three separate
branches of government and limiting the powers of the federal government). The
Constitution establishes the three great departments of the federal government,
but it sketches out the executive and judicial branches in only the broadest
strokes; it leaves Congress to fill in the details, while the courts must then decide
whether Congress’s gloss is consistent with the constitutional framework. Once
again, the text provides only limited guidance. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
634 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A judge . . . may be surprised at the poverty of
really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of
executive power.”); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of black and white.”).
90. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1033, 1056 (1981) (“The various provisions of the Constitution reflect a
multitude of values.”).
91. For example, one person’s constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion may conflict with another person’s freedom of speech or freedom to marry,
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Alternatively, the disputed point may involve a problem that
earlier generations could not have anticipated because it is a
problem uniquely ours—one made possible because of
technological, scientific, or social changes that have occurred in the
intervening years. 92 Thus, as Justice Jackson noted in West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 93 “the task of translating
the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of
the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into
concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the
twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence.” 94 One need
only contemplate such innovations as modern telecommunications
or thermal imaging. 95 The founders could not have anticipated all
of the constitutional questions engendered by such developments
because they could not have anticipated the developments
themselves. 96
and the application of the establishment clause may well conflict with that of the
free exercise clause. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and
Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and
Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 89 (1990) (seeking to find a middle
ground between free exercise and establishment clauses—seemingly “clashing or
divergent value systems” in a “battle of interpretation”). See also Tom Gjelten, In
Religious Freedom Debate, Two American Values Clash, NPR (Feb. 28, 2017, 4:47
AM), https://perma.cc/PEG3-ZMED (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (discussing how two
core
American
values—freedom
of
religion
and
freedom
from
discrimination— collided in courts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Similarly, laws that protect one person’s right to speak may conflict with
another person’s property interest. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding state law recognizing peaceful expressive
activity on private property in certain circumstances); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (upholding private shopping center’s prohibition of handbill
distribution when distribution was possible on public property); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (upholding the rights of individuals to
distribute religious materials in company town).
92. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (addressing how
the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment should apply to
“modern cell phones”).
93. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
94. Id. at 639.
95. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (requiring a
warrant for non-trespassory monitoring activities within a dwelling through
thermal imaging).
96. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (requiring a warrant
to wiretap a public phone booth); Sandalow, supra note 90, at 1060

370

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 (2020)

The possibility of mining definitive answers from
constitutional text is further limited by the inherent inadequacy of
language. Madison recognized this fact in Federalist 37, where he
wrote that “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest
technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal,
until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications.” 97 Indeed,
no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for
every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many
equivocally denoting different ideas. . . . [H]owever accurately
objects may be discriminated in themselves, . . . the definition
of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the
terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy
must be greater or less, according to the complexity and novelty
of the objects defined. 98

Much of the challenge for constitutional interpretation arises
not from any judicial propensity to proceed without appropriate
regard for the relevant text, but from the text’s understandable
failure to answer the precise question presented, and, thus, the felt
need to consult additional interpretive aids. 99 Moreover, the
The reality of our tradition . . . has not been to determine the meaning
of the Constitution by reference to the sense originally intended to be
put into it, but rather for the sense which can be quarried out of it. The
“quest does not run primarily in terms of historical intent. It runs in
terms of what the words can be made to bear, in making sense in the
new light of what was originally unforeseen.”
(quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 374 (1960)).
97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
98. Id. Madison noted that even God has difficulty making his meaning clear
when required to communicate in human language. See id. (“When the Almighty
himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning,
luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the cloudy medium
through which it is communicated.”); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
414 (1819)
Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the
mind, in all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more
common than to use words in a figurative sense. . . . [A word gains
meaning from its connection] with other words. . . . [I]n its construction,
the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are all
to be taken into view.
99. See BOBBITT, supra note 76, at 38 (“More important, in a Constitution of
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constitutional text does not prescribe any particular method for
interpreting its provisions; and most judges would undoubtedly
acknowledge the need for individual judgment, albeit one
disciplined by the requirements of principled decision-making and
adherence to recognized professional standards. 100 Judges are not
limited powers what is not expressed must also be interpreted.”). In addition, the
nation’s circumstances and problems have changed dramatically since the
drafting of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or even the Civil War
Amendments. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 144, 165
(2016)
A judge is a member of a political institution. He must constantly
safeguard the conditions of his own legitimacy by respecting past
precedents and norms of decision-making. On a multimember court, he
must negotiate with others who may not share his substantive or
methodological commitments. For a judge, theories of interpretation
cannot and do not exist apart from theories of adjudication.
See also POWELL, supra note 31, at 119 (“Under our practices . . . questions of
constitutional meaning are questions of law, to be resolved through the forms of
legal argument.”); Morawetz, supra note 63, at 59 (Judges “are constrained
individually by a particular way of addressing and understanding interpretive
questions and they are constrained collectively by the fact that the shared practice
embraces a limited range of ways of proceeding”); David F. Levi, Autocrat of the
Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1801 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK (2008))
[T]he observation that in [most] cases judges of different political
stripes, genders, religions, races, ages, and experience all reach the
same conclusion might be seen as the important point if one were to
describe how judges think most of the time, instead of how appellate
judges think a little bit of the time in uncertain cases.
Max Bloom, The Supreme Court Still Knows How To Find A Consensus, NATIONAL
REVIEW (June 29, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://perma.cc/4HUG-CLJA (last visited Oct.
16, 2019) (noting that in a typical, recent term, “[o]ver half of the [the Supreme
Court’s] cases were unanimous, and only 14% were decided by a 5–3 or 5–4 split.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Paul H. Edelman,
David Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the
Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129 (2012) (concluding that Supreme
Court consensuses cannot be explained by ideology alone); Cass R. Sunstein,
Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
770 (2015) (noting that most significant cases often result in 5–4 decisions and
that Chief Justice Roberts views such decisions as making it “harder for the public
to respect the Court as an impartial institution that transcends partisan
politics”); M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A
Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 283 (2007)
When John Roberts acceded to the position of Chief Justice . . . , he
stated that one of his top priorities was to reduce the number of
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free to do whatever they want. 101 They necessarily exercise
individual judgment, but they do so within a tradition—an area
circumscribed by precedents, acknowledged conventions, and
common craft values.
There are several recognized interpretive approaches that a
particular judge may favor, either generally or as an appropriate
method for tackling particular kinds of constitutional issues. Philip
Bobbitt has identified five of them: historical arguments (based on
the intent of those who drafted and ratified the relevant provision),
textual arguments (based on the present sense of the words of the
Constitution), structural arguments (based on the structure of the
Constitution and the relationships it creates between citizens and
the government), prudential arguments (based on the courts’

dissenting opinions. . . . Roberts believes dissent is a symptom of
dysfunction. This belief is shared with many justices past and present,
the most famous [being] John Marshall, who squelched virtually all
dissent during his 35 years as Chief Justice. One of their arguments is
that dissent weakens the Court by exposing internal divisions publicly.
101. Precedents may be overruled, for example, but most judges would insist
that there must be a very good reason for doing so. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of
law . . . requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent
is . . . indispensable.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010)
(Kennedy, J.) (“[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula
of adherence to the latest decision.”); id. at 378 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[Stare
decisis’s] greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law. It
follows that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular
precedent does more damage to this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we
must be more willing to depart from that precedent.”). When precedents are
overruled,
[T]here is a burden of justification. The precedent from which we are
departing should be stated, and our reasons for rejecting it should be
made convincingly clear. In this way, the law grows and changes, but
it does so incrementally, in response to the dictates of reason, and not
because judges have simply changed their minds.
Anastasoff v. United States, 23 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir.) (Arnold, J.), vacated as
moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). In other words, the principle of stare decisis
carries great weight, but it is ultimately a matter for judicial discretion or
judgment, and not, as Senator Susan Collins recently stated in explaining her
vote in favor of Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation, a constitutional command. See
Abigail Abrams, Sen. Susan Collins’ Full Speech About Voting to Confirm
Kavanaugh, TIME (Oct. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/B92S-Y8QS (last visited Oct. 16,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

SUPREME COURT JOURNALISM

373

self-conscious institutional needs), and doctrinal arguments (based
on precedent and academic commentary on precedent). 102
But these approaches are simply illustrative. For example,
Justice Scalia professed to be primarily interested in the meaning
that the words of the text conveyed when they were adopted. 103 In
some cases, he also looked to long-standing governmental
practice 104 and he clearly recognized the practical importance of
adhering to precedent. 105 He was not interested in “textual or
“historical” arguments, at least insofar as Bobbitt understood
those terms. 106 On the other hand, Justice Breyer is interested, not
just in the words of a particular provision, but in why the provision
was adopted, in what its drafters meant to accomplish, and in what
the practical consequences might be of adopting one or another
102. BOBBITT, supra note 76, at 7. Bobbitt calls these approaches “archetypes”
because “many arguments take on aspects of more than one type,” and, in fact,
“these five types are not all there are.” Id. Other scholars might describe them in
different terms. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 40, at 1189–90 (describing forms of
argument in different terms).
103. See Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV. J.L.
PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (1989)
Many, if not most, of the provisions of the Constitution do not make
sense except as they are given meaning by the historical background
in which they were adopted. For example, the phrase “due process of
law” would have meant something quite different to a
sixteenth-century Tahitian from what it in fact meant to an
eighteenth-century American.
(footnotes omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
104. See Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in
Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1945–46 (2017) (discussing Justice Scalia’s
view that longstanding and uncontested governmental practice should be
regarded as essentially conclusive).
105. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 138–39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“Originalism, like any other theory of
interpretation put into practice in an ongoing system of law, must accommodate
the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the world anew.”); Barrett, supra
note 72, at 1711 (discussing respective views of Justices Scalia and Thomas on
stare decisis). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxv (2012)
(discussing Justice Scalia’s acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation theory as a matter of precedent).
106. See generally SCALIA, supra note 105 (discussing the manner in which he
approached statutory and constitutional interpretation); Scalia, Originalism,
supra note 40 (examining Chief Justice Taft’s originalist approach).
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plausible interpretation. 107 Justice Breyer also believes that
“active liberty” is the central value of the Constitution, and that
the text should always be read with that value in mind. 108 Justice
Brennan, on the other hand, thought that human dignity was the
central value of the Constitution, and that the text should be read
with that value in mind. 109
The Justices also approach the process of interpretation from
various theoretical perspectives that may be relevant to specific
parts of the Constitution. For example, some Justices have thought
that the anti-discrimination principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment is predominantly an anti-classification principle,
whereas others have thought that the anti-discrimination
principle is mainly an anti-subordination principle. 110 In the area
of separation of powers, some Justices have approached problems
from the standpoint of formalism, while others have taken a more
107. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 856–57 (1992) (discussing the utility of legislative
history when the text of a statute does not answer the question facing the court).
108. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5–6 (2006) (“My thesis is that courts should take greater account
of the Constitution’s democratic nature when they interpret constitutional and
statutory texts. . . . In a word, my theme is democracy and the Constitution. I
illustrate a democratic theme—‘active liberty’—which resonates throughout the
Constitution.”).
109. See, e.g., Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial
Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 223–24 (1998)
(discussing the centrality of human dignity for Justice Brennan throughout his
time on the Court). See also Barry Sullivan, Prophesy, Public Theology, and
Questions of Justice: Some Modest Reflections, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 45, 55–56
(2018) (noting that Justice Brennan followed Justice Murphy in this regard).
Later Justices, especially Justice Kennedy, have made the concept of human
dignity central to their constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, passim (2015). It should be emphasized, however, that
none of the Justices’ judicial work can fully be explained in terms of their reliance
on only one form of constitutional interpretation, whatever their judicial and
extra-curial protestations to the contrary might be. They all resort to various
interpretive techniques in actually deciding cases. See, e.g., SEGALL, supra note
54, at 122 (showing that the opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas cannot be
explained solely in terms of their professed commitment to originalism).
110. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470,
1477 (2004) (providing an overview of how the law of equal protection is affected
according to whether the equal protection clause is understood to serve either
anti-subordination or anti-classification purposes).
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functionalist approach. 111 Similarly, the Justices may approach
questions of presidential power from the perspective of
“presidentialist” theory or that of pluralist theory. 112
It seems inevitable that the Justices will have their own
understandings of the various parts of the Constitution, how those
parts fit together, what the text settles and does not settle, the
rules that properly should be applied in ascertaining the meaning
of the Constitution, what materials should be consulted in
interpreting the Constitution, and how those materials should be
weighed when they point in different directions. 113 When the
meaning of the Constitution appears self-evident to most of the
Justices, none of these understandings will matter. 114 But often, as
Justice Breyer has said, “[L]egal questions that reach the Supreme
Court are difficult, uncertain, and close ones.” 115 When that is the
case, different interpretive methods and considerations may point
111. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chief Justice Burger’s
majority opinion in Chadha provides a strong formalist argument, while Justice
White’s dissent is an excellent example of the functionalist approach. See also
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 30–35 (2009) (observing that judicial “formalism” operates to
discourage judges from making discretionary decisions that challenge the
primacy of legislative power).
112. See e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that nonliteral separation-of-powers questions
should be resolved in light of the need for a “workable government”).
113. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opinion
of Rehnquist, J.)
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle
years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated at
least some tentative notions that would influence them in their
interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their
interaction with one another. It would not be merely unusual, but
extraordinary, if they had not at least given opinions as to
constitutional issues in their previous legal careers. Proof that a
Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula
rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack
of qualification, not lack of bias.
114. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 54 (2012) (“But more often the language is not
plain and unambiguous, so that to figure out its meaning, the implicit process of
interpretation . . . must be made express.”).
115. Stephen G. Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120
YALE L.J. 1999, 2013 (2011).
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to different results, and that will require the making of judgments
about the relative relevance and strengths of those interpretive
strategies, and, ultimately, the development of some means of
harmonizing or prioritizing methods and results. 116 The
inescapable role of judges is to evaluate the possible solutions to
legal problems that have no incontrovertibly correct answer and to
choose amongst them, not incarnating their personal and political
preferences, but exercising professional judgment and justifying
their choices according to professional standards and values. 117
The Court’s ultimate answer to a particular question will
necessarily depend on the terms in which the question is argued
by the parties and their lawyers, the understandings of the
individual Justices, the ways in which the individual Justices view
the issues presented, and the ways in which the individual Justices
communicate with each other about their respective
understandings of the law of the Constitution and of the issues
presented in the case at bar. 118 In addition, that “ultimate answer”
will necessarily be provisional by definition. 119
116. See Fallon, supra note 40, at 1190 (“The commensurability problem is to
show how arguments of all of these various kinds fit together in a single, coherent
constitutional calculus.”). Professor Fallon posits a case in which arguments in
two categories point in one direction, but arguments in the other three point in a
different direction. Id. at 1191. He continues: “Should arguments in one or more
of the categories necessarily have taken precedence? Was some sort of balancing
required, and, if so, what sort? Or was the problem of the best arguments in
different categories yielding opposite results somehow false or illusory?” Id. at
1191. These questions are “among the most important in constitutional law.” Id.
117. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 39, at 49 (“[I]t is law—and not the
personal politics of individuals judges—that controls judicial decision
making . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
118. See Breyer, supra note 108, at 8 (“But the fact that most judges agree
that these basic elements—language, history, tradition, precedent, purpose, and
consequence—are useful does not mean they agree about just where and how to
use them.”). Whatever a Justice’s predispositions or understandings might be, it
is important, as a normative matter, that he or she listen carefully, honestly, and
with an open mind to the arguments that are made, both by the lawyers involved
in the case and by his or her colleagues on the Court. See Sullivan, Listening,
supra note 48, 355–58 (2016); Sullivan & Canty, supra note 32, at 1005
(discussing the public perception (and professional norm) that judges should take
seriously what they hear, engaging rigorously and respectfully, reflecting on the
issues presented in a case as seriously as they would if their personal interests
were at stake).
119. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
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Strongly contested cases raise an important question in the
minds of the American public: How can it be that different Justices
reach different conclusions? Are they simply calling balls and
strikes according to a clear “legal” rulebook? 120 Or are they simply
voting according to their personal and political preferences? 121
Many commentators have indicated that these mutually exclusive
propositions are the only ones that can supply the answer to this
singularly important question. We do not think that that is the
case. On the contrary, we think that a third possible
explanation— one that acknowledges the complexities of
constitutional interpretation on its own terms—is more accurate
descriptively and more desirable normatively. But our judgment in
that regard is beside the point. More important is the fact that
most Americans seem to prefer this model of judicial review to the
oversimplified extremes that have often dominated press coverage
and popular discourse.
B. The Process of Interpretation: Public Understanding and
Public Support
Scholarly perceptions of what the Court does or should do
seem far less important for present purposes than what the public
believes is—and should be—the case. After all, it is ultimately the
public that has the greatest power to approve or disapprove the
Court’s performance in the long term. To assess whether public
confidence in the Court is contingent on the public’s perception
that the Court follows any one of the three models of judicial
decision-making described above, one must first establish that the
public understands the various ways of describing the Court’s work
and appreciates the differences amongst them. Only then can one
1365, 1366 (1997) (“Readings of the Constitution change. This is the brute fact of
our Constitutional past. The Constitution is read at one time to mean one thing;
at another to mean something quite different.”).
120. See Scheb & Lyons II, supra note 57, at 183 (“The myth of legality holds
that . . . judges should make their decisions on the basis of nonpolitical factors.”).
121. See id. (“‘Crude legal realism’ . . . implies a belief that judges make their
decisions on the basis of overly political factors: partisanship, justices’ ideologies,
public opinion, and the influence of Congress and the president.”).
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ask which model the public prefers, and whether it will extend or
withdraw its loyalty to the Court on that account.
1. Public Understanding
In recent decades, academics have attempted to ascertain the
public’s preferred modes of judicial decision-making. 122 Much of
this literature maps onto the scholarly “law-or-politics” debate
concerning the most appropriate model of judicial review. 123
Consequently, many studies are designed to measure whether
Americans understand the Court to be a “pure law” institution or
a “pure politics” institution; whether they prefer a “legal” or
“political” model of judicial review; and whether they perceive a
gulf between their preference and the Court’s actual performance
of its adjudicatory function. 124 The studies are designed in a way
that generally does not present their informants with the
alternative of a “principled discretion” model as such.
Nevertheless, reading the studies closely, and drawing inferences
from the results, suggests that Americans not only appreciate the
difference between legal decision-making and political
decision-making, but that they understand (without disapproving)
that the Court often decides cases using a mode of decision-making
that draws on both.
For example, two-thirds of Americans polled by Gregory Casey
in 1974 (the year after the Supreme Court’s controversial decision
in Roe v. Wade 125) indicated their belief that the Court’s “main job”
is to act as either a “legal” institution or as an institution devoted
to deciding “unresolved questions” in American society. 126
122. See, e.g., Scheb & Lyons I, supra note 52, at 928 (investigating the extent
to which the public subscribes to the “myth of legality”). See also Casey, supra
note 4, at 393 (discussing the ways in which the public may view the Supreme
Court).
123. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 4. See also Scheb & Lyons II, supra note 57,
at 183 (considering only legality and “legal realism”).
124. See, e.g., Scheb & Lyons II, supra note 57 at 183 (indicating that their
study was designed to determine whether the public believes that the Supreme
Court should make its decisions based on legal or political factors).
125. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
126. Casey, supra note 4, at 393. Some 39% of respondents said the Court’s
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Moreover, respondents who indicated that the Court’s job was to
do “law,” also said that they understood “law” not as a “static”
system, but as a “dynamic and adaptive” one. 127 That is, they
seemed to appreciate that some conflicts could be decided in a
rule-based fashion, by consulting precedent or the founders’ intent,
while others might require more flexible strategies. 128 Thus,
Professor Casey’s respondents appeared to conceive of judicial
decision-making as proceeding on the basis of “pure law,” where
possible, or on an adaptive approach that may take additional
considerations into account where emerging questions are beyond
the purview of dispositive legal texts. 129 Another 30% identified the
Court’s role as “policymaking,” which was defined as “openly and
visibly making political decisions and exercising social choices
comparable to Congress.” 130 In other words, the Casey study
suggests that the public is at least conversant with all three
possible models of judicial review.
The public’s apparent understanding of these various
approaches to judicial review was underscored in a 2001 study that
presented the study respondents with a menu of possible factors
thought to drive judicial decisions, including founders’ intent,
precedent, “public good” (judges’ personal views of what is good for
the public when the Constitution is silent), ideology (defined as
“whether judges are liberals or conservatives”), party affiliation,
and the preferences of the political branches or the public. 131 Most
task was linked to the Constitution, the law, and the practice of law, while 30%
of respondents indicated that the Court’s job was to be a final arbiter of
“unresolved questions.” Id. at 393–95.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 394.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 395–96.
131. Scheb & Lyons I, supra note 52, at 932. Founders’ intent was mentioned
by 93.8% of respondents as an element that should have some or a large impact
on Court decisions; precedent by 85.4%; and public good by 73.5%. Scheb & Lyons
II, supra note 57, at 185 tbl. 1. Both of the Scheb and Lyons works cited were
based on the same underlying survey and dataset, although the authors
presented the data somewhat differently in each piece. See Scheb & Lyons I, supra
note 52, at 932 tbl. 1; cf. Scheb & Lyons II, supra note 57, at 184 tbl. 1. Precedent
was mentioned by 89.7% as actually having some or a large impact on Court
decisions; ideology by 85.1%; public good by 80.0%; and framer intent by 77.9%.
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respondents selected founders’ intent, precedent, and public good
as the most appropriate drivers of judicial decisions. 132 Only 27%
of respondents said that partisanship should have some or a large
impact on the Court’s work. 133 These results echo the Casey study,
and suggest that the public discerns a genuine difference between
decision-making guided exclusively by legal commands,
decision-making following legal commands but integrating
individual beliefs and experiences, and decision-making designed
solely to facilitate external political goals. 134 In addition, 70% of
respondents reported thinking that, even though ideology should
play no role in decision-making, it actually did have either some or
a large impact. 135 One might infer from these results that a
majority of the public understands that the Court may not always
act strictly in accord with public preferences for decision-making,
and that disfavored factors might sometimes drive judicial
decisions. However, because a majority identified “legal” drivers as
appropriate and “partisan” drivers as inappropriate, it stands to
reason that most respondents would be less offended by a “mixed”
model that gave greater weight to legal factors than political
ones. 136 This raises the possibility that the judiciary may forfeit its
132. Scheb & Lyons I, supra note 52, at 932.
133. Scheb & Lyons I, supra note 52; see also Scheb & Lyons II, supra note 57.
134. See Casey, supra note 4, at 393. To be sure, inferring from these studies
that the public fully appreciates the differences amongst “pure law,” “pure
politics,” and “principled discretion” models—and has discernable preferences
amongst them—is somewhat challenging. That is the case, at least in part,
because of the terminology that was used in the survey instruments. Researchers
do not clearly define “ideology,” “partisanship,” or the differences between them.
Consequently, the extent of public tolerance for extralegal factors influencing
judicial decision-making is hard to assess. It does appear, however, that the public
understands that there is a distinction to be drawn amongst beliefs, values, and
party affiliation. And the public seems to believe that each of those factors exerts
a different influence on the Court. For example, in surveys conducted in
2005–2006, Gibson and Caldeira found that about 57% of those polled agreed that
judges take individual beliefs into account. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 60, at
207. About 48% agreed with the proposition that political values influence judicial
decision-making, while only 39% seemed to think that party affiliations influence
decision-making. Id. Notably, only about 2% of respondents seemed to think that
judges engaged only in pure legal deduction. Id.
135. Scheb & Lyons II, supra note 57, at 185.
136. See id. (showing that the majority of respondents preferred court
decisions based on legal drivers opposed to partisan or ideological drivers).
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necessary, but largely intangible, legitimacy, if the public suspects
that it has veered too far towards the “pure political” model.
2. Public Support
Alexander Hamilton suggested as early as 1788 that public
confidence in the Court was a necessary precondition if judges were
to review (and possibly invalidate) legislation adopted by the
political branches. 137 That is the case because the Court operates,
in many practical ways, at the sufferance of the political branches,
and, ultimately, the people. 138 Congress funds the Court and
determines the scope of its appellate jurisdiction, 139 while the
President controls the hard power that must occasionally be
deployed to compel adherence to the courts’ orders. 140
Consequently, those branches have some leverage to exert if they
are displeased with the Court’s decision-making, subject, of course,
to further objection by the public. When, at least in recent times,
137. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 28, at 522–24 (discussing the
judicial department and the need for judicial independence).
138. See id. at 523 (“The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword
or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and
can take no active resolution whatever.”).
139. See, e.g., Eugenia Froedge Tona, Congressional Influence and the
Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 146
(1991) (“Congress signals its overall approval or disapproval of the Court’s
direction through budgetary allocations.”); Daniels v. Rock Island R.R. Co., 70
U.S. 250, 254 (1865) (“[I]t is for Congress to determine how far, within the limits
of the capacity of this court to take, appellate jurisdiction shall be given, and when
conferred, it can be exercised only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by
law.”). Congress also determines the size of the Court, and the Senate passes on
the acceptability of nominees for the Court. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22,
16 Stat. 44 (setting the full complement of Supreme Court Justices at nine).
140. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 752–54
(1975) (discussing President Eisenhower’s apparent reluctance to support and
enforce desegregation after the Court’s decision in Brown); Tara Leigh Grove, The
Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 497–98
(2018) (discussing President Eisenhower’s eventual position that “all Americans”
have a “solemn duty” to comply with court orders); JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN,
CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: JUDGE JOHN MINOR WISDOM 147–78 (2009) (discussing
the Kennedy Administration’s actions to enforce court orders requiring the
admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi).

382

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 (2020)

the political branches have been tempted to use that power to
dilute or curtail the Court’s authority, an American public loyal to
the Court has opposed those efforts. 141
Because the Court’s power, as a practical matter, is arguably
coextensive with the public’s “loyalty” to the Court, Court-watchers
have been tracking public attitudes towards the institution for
some time; and they have more recently begun to ask what drives
Americans towards or away from this branch of government. 142
While short-term “approval” of the Court tends to fluctuate in
response to specific case outcomes, long-term “loyalty” to the Court
tends to reflect impressions about how the Court more generally
reaches decisions across multiple cases. 143 In other words, loyalty
has been identified as correlating with perceptions of which
decision-making model the Court uses. 144 Loyalty to the Court
appears to intensify when the public believes that the Justices are
deciding cases based on “pure law”; to hold steady when the public
believes that the Justices are calling on abstract personal values
in legal decision-making; and to decline when the public believes
the Court is deciding cases solely to further the external goals of
141. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate over Judicial
Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 760 (1998)
[W]ith regard to the few techniques for controlling the judiciary with
which the country has experimented [such as Court-packing and
jurisdiction-stripping], history plainly shows a trend of gradual
refutation by the body politic. Not only has the public gradually come
to reject these strategies for controlling the courts, . . . (for what it is
worth), no politician has profited in the long run from attacking the
courts.
During the Court-packing controversy of 1937, Max Lerner observed (somewhat
disparagingly) that the Court’s power and legitimacy depended on the American
public’s naive belief that the Court “protected” the Constitution by exercising the
power of judicial review without regard to politics. Max Lerner, Constitution and
Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1308–12 (1937). As Barry Friedman has
suggested, the “give-and-take between the courts and the people is of the utmost
consequence, for through it the substance of constitutional law is forged. . . . As
judicial rulings respond to social forces, and vice versa, constitutional law is
made.” BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 384 (2009).
142. See Roger Handberg, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme
Court, 1935–1981, 59 INT’L SOC. SCI. REV. 3, 10–11 (1984) (discussing the public’s
changing perception of the Court).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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political organizations. 145 Of course, what the public believes the
Court to be doing turns largely on what the media tells them that
the Court is doing, as discussed in Part III below. 146
Formal attempts to measure the public’s response to the Court
seem to have begun in earnest in the mid-twentieth century. 147
Those attempts have taken two primary forms: polling, which is
thought to be effective at capturing contemporaneous approval for
the Court’s decisional output, and social science studies, which
measure long-term, so-called “diffuse” loyalty to the Court as an
institution. 148
Although the Gallup poll first included a question about the
Supreme Court in 1935, an annual measurement of public
approval for the Court did not begin until the mid-1970s. 149 In
early polling, support for the Court appeared to vary widely from
year to year, as pollsters revised their questions in ways that
apparently elicited fluctuating responses. 150 For example, in 1956
(not long after the Court’s controversial decision in Brown),
pollsters asked whether the Court was taking on more authority
than the Constitution delegated, and 76% of respondents
disagreed, suggesting a high level of support for the Court. 151 The
following year, pollsters asked whether respondents trusted the
Court more than Congress, and only 30% answered affirmatively,
suggesting a low level of support that may be more attributable to
the change in the framing of the question than to a sudden change
in public sentiment. 152 Consequently, the early polls are not
145. Id.
146. See infra Part III.
147. See Handberg, supra note 142, at 5 (“[N]ational surveys of attitudes
toward the United States Supreme Court were sporadic until essentially the
1960s and 1970s.”).
148. See id. (describing polling practices in the mid-twentieth century).
149. Id. at 10–11.
150. See id. at 10 (“[P]ublic evaluations of the Court are very volatile and
subject to wide fluctuations, depending upon context.”).
151. Id. at 6–9.
152. See id. at 9 (stating that the “wide swing” in results is related to question
format—the 1956 question “was essentially a civics textbook type probe” and the
1957 question was “comparative” in nature). These superficially different
numbers are likely less attributable to a sharp change in opinion about the Court
than to a public intuition that although the Court had been acting within its
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reliable indicators of public support for the Court. From the
mid-1970s onward, however, the pollsters consistently have asked
the same question about how much confidence respondents had in
the Court, and these polls are therefore thought to track more
reliably the upward and downward fluctuations in public
confidence in the Court. 153 The percentage of respondents stating
that they had “a great deal or quite a lot” of confidence in the Court
plateaued at about 50% from 1997 to 2003. 154 Since then, it has
fallen—hitting a low of 32% in 2008. 155 Although the level of
expressed public confidence occasionally rose in the next eight
years, it has never again exceeded 40%. 156 The AP-NORC General
Social Survey (GSS) shows the same longitudinal decline in
“confidence” for the Supreme Court between 1973 and 2013, with
31% of respondents reporting “a great deal of confidence” in the
Court in 1973 and just 23% reporting the same level of confidence
by 2013. 157 In 2013, 54% said they had only “some” confidence in
the Court and 20% reported having hardly any, demonstrating the
Court’s worst performance ever on the GSS to that date. 158
Political scientists have contended, however, that falling poll
results do not necessarily indicate a “crisis of confidence” in the
Court. 159 Because the Court is designed to be a
delegated authority in Brown, a legislative solution to school segregation might
have been preferable. The fluctuations in the percentages of “supportive”
responses from 1935 to 1957 (53%, 59%, 40%, 66%, 36%, 76%, and 30% for the
sequence of polls during that period) likely reflect this phenomenon. Notably, once
Gallup began asking standardized questions from year to year in 1963, the results
could be more legitimately attributed to genuine changes in public support for the
Court. From 1963 to 1969, the results from Gallup polls were uniformly in the 30s
or 40s. Id.
153. CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS (2019), GALLUP ORGANIZATION,
https://perma.cc/258Z-5ZAW (PDF). Notably, there are some minor discrepancies
between Gallup’s summary of its polling history and Handberg’s summary of the
same work during the same period.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Sofi Sinozich, Public Opinion on the US Supreme Court, 1973–2015, 81
PUB. OPINION Q. 173 tbl.6 (2017).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., James. L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta
Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J.
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counter-majoritarian institution, they explain, many respondents
can be expected to object to some of the Court’s decisions at any
particular time. 160 In other words, spikes and valleys in
“confidence” may well suggest that the Court is actually
functioning as intended. More important than contemporaneous or
short-term approval, political scientists suggest, is the public’s
long-term institutional loyalty or “diffuse support,” 161 which they
define as “opposition to making fundamental structural and
functional changes in the institution.” 162 It is therefore more
important for the public to be “loyal” to the Court than to have
“confidence” in its decisions. 163 Such loyalty can serve to discourage
the political branches from encroaching on the Court’s authority
by attempting to curb its jurisdiction or manipulating its
composition. 164
Over time, the public seems to have been quite “loyal” to the
Court, and some research has indicated that this loyalty correlates
with the public’s perceptions about judicial behavior. As early as
1994, researchers found that public esteem for the Court was
driven by the public’s perception about whether the Justices were
“neutral.” When researchers asked about the Court’s authority on
the controversial issue of abortion, for example, they found that
[p]eople’s views about whether the Court should be empowered
to make abortion decisions were not related either to general
agreement or disagreement with Court decisions or to judgment
about the general fairness of Court decisions; rather, procedural
fairness concerns predominated in judgments of whether the
Court should be [so] empowered . . . . 165
POL. SCI. 354, 354–56 (2003) (stating that the existence of an actual “crisis of
confidence in the Court” depends on whether “confidence [is] synonymous with
institutional legitimacy,” and on what is actually meant by having “‘only some’ or
‘hardly any’ confidence in the leaders of an institution”).
160. See id. at 359 (noting that substantial segments of society may disagree
with specific Court decisions).
161. Id. at 356–59.
162. Id. at 358.
163. See id. at 358–59 (highlighting the “remarkably high level of loyalty
toward the Supreme Court on the part of most Americans”).
164. See id. (reporting that the majority of Americans “generally” trust the
Court and would not choose to abolish it).
165. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 6, at 770.
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As to what the respondents meant by this concern with procedural
fairness, the researchers found that
[t]he most significant component of procedural justice with
regard to the Supreme Court involves perceptions of neutrality.
Justices who are viewed as honest, impartial, and deliberative,
basing their decision on case-relevant information, rather than
as driven by political pressures and personal opinion, are
performing legitimately in the eyes of the public. 166

The study authors interpreted the respondents’ affinity for
“neutrality” as a general preference that “the law, not personal
values and opinions, should drive outcomes.” 167 They
acknowledged that judicial adherence to this model is sometimes
difficult, but observed that it was nevertheless “deeply rooted in
our history and in our shared principles of political legitimacy.” 168
The public’s disapproval of a “political” model of judicial
review seems as strong as its approval of the “legal” model. In a
2001 study, researchers found that respondents with “hardly any”
confidence in the Court were also deeply suspicious that the Court
followed a “political” model of judicial review; only 21.3% of those
who lacked confidence in the Court agreed with the statement that
the “Court does not favor some groups,” and only 21.2% of that
group agreed with the statement that the “Court does not get too
mixed up in politics.” 169 Among those who had “a great deal” of
confidence in the Court, 55.6% agreed with the statement that the
“Court does not favor some groups,” and 61.7% agreed with the
statement that the “Court does not get too mixed up in politics.” 170
This study therefore suggests a possible correlation between
166. Id. at 786.
167. Id. at 788. The authors also noted that some theorists have linked
“neutrality” to jurisprudential approaches that are understood to reflect policy
orientations, but they specified that the definition of neutrality that they supplied
to respondents was not designed to incorporate jurisprudential connotations of
the word. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,
27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1975)).
169. Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra note 159, at 362 tbl.6 (emphasis
added). The table indicates that 179 respondents out of 1,418 had “hardly any”
confidence in the Court.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
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perceptions of politicization and loss of institutional loyalty to the
Court. 171
At the same time, it appears that the public may have a very
specific and narrow understanding of what it means for the Court
to be unacceptably “politicized.” The same researchers found in a
later study that support for the Court was highest “among
those . . . asserting that [the political views of the Justices] are
relevant” and among those who assert that, “judges are not simply
politicians in robes.” 172 These results, the researchers surmised,
indicated a distaste for Justices who “describe their
decisionmaking processes in insincere ways.” 173 In other words,
they concluded that, “support for the Court is not damaged by
acceptance of [the attitudinal model], but support depends upon
seeing judges as different from ordinary politicians, in part
because, unlike politicians, they are principled in their
decisionmaking.” 174
In other words, although the public might strongly prefer that
the Court act in a mechanistically “legal” fashion, it seems to
accept that where textual sources do not provide a clear answer,
the Justices must resort to principled discretion, and employ
policy- or value-infused interpretive tools. What the public rejects
as inappropriate “judicial” behavior appears to be “pure political”
activity
marked
by
group-favoring,
outcome-oriented
decision-making analogous to that of the political branches but
hidden behind claims of neutrality.
In short, social science research has raised the possibility that
public loyalty to the Court is linked to the public’s perceptions
about which decision-making model best accounts for its decisions.
And because public perceptions of the Court are heavily influenced
by journalistic depictions of its work, it stands to reason that
whether journalists frame the Court’s work as consistent with a
“legal” or “principled discretion” decision-making model—or as one
that is “purely political”—will have implications for public loyalty
to the institution. In other words, press linguistics matter; they
171. Id. Notably, even among those with little confidence in the Court, 70.4%
reported that they would not do away with the Court if given the opportunity.
172. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 60, at 209.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 209, 210 tbl.1.
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have the potential to influence the Court’s standing with the
public.
III. Media Depictions of the Supreme Court
Most Americans learn about the Court primarily through
news coverage. Press depictions of the Court’s decision-making
processes therefore have the power to inform the public about
whether the Court is following legal commands, political
convictions, or some combination of the two. For this reason, public
loyalty to the Court may well be influenced by choices that
journalists make in the way that they cover this least visible
branch of government.
A. Media Coverage of the Court: A Crucial Conduit
Americans typically know far less about the Supreme Court
than they do about the political branches of the national
government. 175 And the public’s interest in the Court’s work is
uneven at best. 176 “[I]ndividual knowledge of how the Court works
or who sits on the Court is minimal [and] most Americans fail to
grasp the reach of the Supreme Court or how what the Court does
might matter in their lives.” 177 This is not surprising for several
reasons.
175. See, e.g., ELLIOT E. SLOTNICK & JENNIFER A. SEGAL, TELEVISION NEWS AND
SUPREME COURT: ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO AIR? 3 (1998) (noting that
Congress and the president “are certainly the most visible and obviously political
in our national government; they are also the two national institutions to which
American citizens are linked directly by elections”). For example, a 2015 study by
the Annenberg Public Policy Center indicated that 35% of Americans who knew
that there are three branches of government could not identify the judiciary as
one of those branches, and 15% thought that once the Court decided a case by a
5–4 vote, the matter would be sent back to Congress for reconsideration.
ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, 2015 Constitution Day Civics Study,
https://perma.cc/L22N-R8BT (PDF).
176. See SLOTNICK & SEGAL, supra note 175, at 8–9 (distinguishing between
“two publics that receive Supreme Court messages: a ‘continuous public’
(composed of attorneys, judges, law enforcement officers, and lawmakers) and a
less attentive ‘intermittent public’”).
177. Tyler Johnson & Erica Socker, Actions, Factions, and Interactions:
THE
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Unlike members of the judiciary, the president and members
of the legislative branch stand for election and undergo the public
scrutiny that the electoral process necessarily entails. 178 These
extended rituals (the duration of which has increased dramatically
in recent years) provide “media-ready drama,” and serve to inform
voters about candidate agendas that will presumably serve as the
foundation for long-term governing, while simultaneously
functioning as a kind of “entertain[ment].” 179 In contrast, federal
judges obtain their posts by being nominated by the president and
having their suitability for the position tested through Senate
confirmation hearings. While these hearings are conducted in
public, the rituals are far more compressed, are conducted solely
by (and technically, for) senators, and tend to focus heavily on legal
issues with little consideration of the nominees’ personalities,
families, or lives. 180
Further, only a small fraction of the Supreme Court’s work is
done in the public eye. The Supreme Court does much of its work
in the privacy of the Justices’ chambers or in the secrecy of the
conference room. 181 Oral arguments—at least at the Supreme
Court—are not televised, and only limited seating is available. 182
Newsworthy Influences on Supreme Court Coverage, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 434, 439
(2012).
178. See, e.g., Daniel Sutter, Media Scrutiny and the Quality of Public
Officials, 129 PUB. CHOICE 25, 25–26 (2006) (acknowledging that public officials
are scrutinized by the media).
179. Todd A. Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, Making the Cases “Real”:
Newspaper Coverage of U.S. Supreme Court Cases 1953–2004, 32 POL. COMM. 23,
23 (2015).
180. See Michael Evans & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, Perpetuating the Myth
of the Culture War Court? Issue Attention in Newspaper Coverage of U.S. Supreme
Court Nominations, 40 AM. POL. RES. 1026, 1027–29 (2012) (discussing the
incongruency between the Court’s agenda and the issues focused on by the
media). Concededly, the “personal” dimension of confirmation hearings has
increasingly moved to the foreground. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas
Fandos, Brett Kavanaugh and Christine Blasey Ford Duel with Tears and Fury,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2018, at A1 (describing the 2018 testimony of Court nominee
Brett Kavanaugh and witness Christine Blasey Ford about highly personal
interactions as teenagers).
181. See generally Arthur Selwyn Miller & D. S. Sastri, Secrecy and the
Supreme Court: On the Need for Piercing the Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUFF. L. REV.
799 (1973).
182. See, e.g., Collins & Cooper, supra note 179, at 24 (discussing the Supreme

390

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 (2020)

In addition, the practice of oral argument has developed in such a
way that an understanding of what is being argued in a case
generally depends, even in the case of lawyers in the audience, on
having studied the written materials ahead of time; it is highly
unlikely that a casual, lay observer would leave the courtroom with
much understanding of what he or she had heard. 183 And most of
the Justices, for a variety of reasons, traditionally have chosen to
keep a low profile and seldom have given interviews. 184 Finally, the
Court’s resistance to the televising of oral arguments).
183. See, e.g., Sullivan & Canty, supra note 32, at 1020–33 (observing that the
current form of oral argument, which affords counsel little opportunity to develop
a narrative or coherent statement and is dominated by the Justices’ comments, is
not particularly accessible to those who have not read the written materials
beforehand).
184. See id. This ethos seems to be shifting. For example, while Justice
Kennedy was mocked in 1993 for giving a self-described “brooding” interview to
the Legal Times hours before the judgment in Planned Parenthood v. Casey was
announced, see, e.g., Terry Eastland, The Tempting of Justice Kennedy, THE
AMERICAN SPECTATOR (1993), Justice Sotomayor has been lionized as “the people’s
justice” for her willingness to pen a revelatory memoir and give supporting media
interviews in 2013, see, e.g., David Fontana, The People’s Justice?, 123 YALE L.J.
FORUM 447 (2014). In addition, Justice Ginsburg has become something of an icon
of popular culture in recent years and has recently been the subject of two feature
films. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, The New Film “RBG” Reveals How Ruth Bader
Ginsburg Became A Meme—And Why That’s So Surprising, WASH. POST (May 3,
2018) (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s influence in popular culture). The Justices
may have become more visible in recent years, but they still do little to aid the
press or the public in developing an early understanding of their work product.
Until the 1920s, the Court did not distribute written opinions on the day they
were issued from the bench. Collins & Cooper, supra note 179, at 24 (citing JOE
MATHEWSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 149 (2011)). The Court still does
not advise reporters in advance of decision day as to which opinions to expect and
be prepared to cover. A Court employee prepares a summary or “syllabus” of each
opinion, which is published at the time the opinion is announced, but the syllabi
apparently are not formally reviewed by the entire Court, and, since 1906, all
opinions have carried the warning that the syllabus “constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader.” See J. David Kirkland, Jr., Rethinking United States
v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 9 J.L.: A PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 98, 98 (2019). The virtual flood of important opinions at the close of
the Term also leaves reporters with limited time to prepare in-depth coverage by
deadline and news outlets have limited space to devote to the lengthy, multiple
opinions that the modern Court often delivers. See Collins & Cooper, supra note
179, at 24; Johnson & Socker, supra note 177, at 436. In fact, the Court did not
supply reporters with written copies of opinions on decision days until 1935. See
Everette E. Dennis, Another Look at Press Coverage of the Supreme Court, 20
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most public aspect of the Court’s work—the issuing of opinions and
other rulings—may actually be the most opaque. Even those
citizens who are interested in the Court’s work product may be
stymied by opinions that are “difficult for the ordinary citizen to
obtain or to understand.” 185
The media therefore play a “vital” role in identifying for the
public the most important aspects of what the Court is doing, and
in translating judicial pronouncements into digestible
narratives. 186 In doing that work, members of Supreme Court press
corps, together with other members of the mainstream press,
aspire to a norm of accuracy and objectivity. 187 But even journalists
VILL. L. REV. 765, 770 (1974). Other constitutional courts take various steps to
improve the media’s and the public’s understanding of their work. For example,
the Canadian Supreme Court now issues summaries of its opinions in non-legal
language, among other things. See News Releases, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/6Q5H-U3LT (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally SAUVAGEAU ET AL.,
supra note 1 (discussing the ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada seeks
to improve press coverage of its decisions, including the institution of a “lock-up”
period, in which reporters are given advance access to opinions under controlled
conditions); Thomas Hochmann, La Communication de la Cour Constitutionelle
Allemande, ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONELLE 33-2017
(2018) (discussing some of the ways in which the Constitutional Court of Germany
has sought to improve press coverage of its decisions). The Supreme Court of the
United States has resisted innovations such as the “lock-up” period. See
MATHEWSON, supra, at 365 (“[T]he Court continues to frown on a hoary proposal
by the news media that they be granted advance reading time under secure
conditions, a ‘lock-up’ to prepare to report decisions as they are announced from
the bench.”).
185. Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at
the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1538 (1996) [hereinafter Greenhouse,
Story].
186. See generally Johnson & Socker, supra note 177, at 434. The same is
doubtless true in other countries as well. See, e.g., SAUVAGEAU ET AL., supra note
1 (Canada); Anat Peleg & Bryna Bogoch, Removing Justitia’s Blindfold: The
Mediatization of Law in Israel, 34 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC. 961 (2012) (Israel); Or
Bassok, Television Coverage of the Israeli Supreme Court 1968–1992: The
Persistence of the Mythical Image, 42 ISR. L. REV. 306 (2009) (Israel); Bryna
Bogoch & Yifat Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli
High Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 53 (2008) (Israel).
187. See, e.g., SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (2014),
https://perma.cc/BL7H-6DNA (PDF) (defining “ethical journalism” and
encouraging its use “by all people in all media”); Greenhouse, Story, supra note
185, at 1548–51 (examining the personal values journalists hold and how those
values influence their choices on what, and what not, to report).
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who strive to comply with this norm necessarily are making choices
about how to describe the Court’s work. Scholars of political
communications agree that most issues can be understood in a
variety of ways. Consequently, choices about which institutional
actions to cover, and how to describe the actions that are chosen
for coverage, are really choices about which understanding of an
issue to emphasize and which to de-emphasize. 188 In news
coverage, these choices can take two forms—“agenda-setting” and
“framing.” Agenda-setting occurs at a high level of generality—in
decisions about which stories to cover and which to ignore. 189
Framing occurs in the linguistic choices that journalists make in
the writing and editing of particular stories. 190 This “framing”
process has the capacity to promote “particular definitions and
interpretations of . . . issues.” 191 Consequently, frames can
influence the attitudes and behaviors of news consumers,
particularly where the audience lacks direct personal experience
with the subject. 192
Media framing occurs when journalists “select some aspects of
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text,” leading the reader to interpret the cause of
the event in a particular way. 193 Journalists, whether
inadvertently or not, frame information in a way that influences
188. See, e.g., Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 103, 104 (2007) (examining how slight changes in the presentation
of an issue can produce changes of opinion in regard to that issue).
189. See Dietram A. Scheufele, Framing as a Theory of Media Effects, 49 J.
COMM. 103, 107 n.3 (1999) (explaining the differences between “agenda setting”
and “framing”).
190. See id. at 105 (“Mass media actively set the frames of reference that
readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events.”). Some political
communications scholars blur or collapse the distinction between agenda-setting
and framing.
191. Chong & Druckman, supra note 188, at 106 (quoting D.V. Shah et al.,
News Framing and Cueing of Issue Regimes, Explaining Clinton’s Public
Approval in Spite of Scandal, 66 PUB. OP. Q. 339, 339–70 (2002)).
192. See id. at 109–10 (examining the effects of frames in communication on
individuals); Catherine Happer & Greg Philo, The Role of the Media in the
Construction of Public Belief and Social Change, 1 J. SOC. POL. PSYCH. 321,
326– 28 (2013) (examining the impact of media content on public belief and
attitudes).
193. Scheufele, supra note 189, at 107.

SUPREME COURT JOURNALISM

393

the reader’s understanding when they construct “patterns in the
arrangements of words or phrases”; when they “impose a causal
theme on their news stories, either in the form of explicit causal
statements [or in linking] observations to the direct quote of a
source”; and when they make rhetorical or “stylistic choices . . . in
relation to their intended effects.” 194 In Supreme Court coverage,
journalists do not typically “frame” when they report the outcome
of the parties’ dispute. As a general matter, this information is
fairly binary; there is little descriptive latitude available in
reporting which party won. However, journalists do have
considerable framing latitude in describing how the Court
exercised its power to decide the case. 195 The journalists’ syntactic,
thematic, and rhetorical choices can depict the Court as an
institution that is primarily legal, primarily political, or
necessarily more complex. 196 In these descriptions, they are

194. Id. at 111.
195. See Stephen P. Nicholson & Robert M. Howard, Framing Support for the
Supreme Court in the Aftermath of Bush v. Gore, 65 J. POL. 676, 680–81 (2003)
(identifying “partisan, legal, and election” as potential frames for that opinion).
196. Of course, journalistic choices about which Supreme Court events should
be covered also influence public understanding about the institution. These
choices operate on an “agenda-setting” level to identify for the public the scope of
the Court’s work. Studies indicate that over time the press has moved from
treating all of the Court’s work as newsworthy per se to covering only a select
portion of the Court’s work, typically focusing on cases involving socially divisive
issues such as civil rights, speech rights, and criminal procedure. According to
Collins & Cooper’s 2015 study of four major national newspapers, aggregate
coverage of Court cases declined from 1953 to 2004. Collins & Cooper, supra note
179, at 30. From 1954 to 1968, more than 98% of argued cases received some
coverage. Id. From 1968 to 1980, however, the pattern of universal coverage began
to deteriorate, with a downward slope of two percentage points a year. Id. From
1980 to 2004, the decline in coverage grew steadier and more pronounced, with a
four-percentage point per year downward slope. Id. Further, the press has
historically found cases involving civil rights and civil liberties “coverage-worthy,”
along with speech cases, criminal justice, and privacy. Id. In contrast, judicial
power and tax cases are rarely covered. Id. at fig. 2. Undeniably, agenda-setting
choices that suggest the Court’s docket is full of culturally divisive issues
contributes to a public perception of the institution as political. However, this
Article focuses on framing choices that have the capacity to influence the public’s
understanding of the tools and craft values that the Court draws upon in reaching
its decisions.
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conveying to readers a “perceived reality” about how the Court
exercises its decision-making power. 197
How journalists frame their explanations of the Court’s work
can dramatically influence the public’s understanding of the
institution and their support for it. In a recent study, researchers
have shown that reader support for the Justices’ work rises when
journalists represent the Court as legally motivated and fall when
they represent it as politically motivated. 198 That study involved
presenting readers with one of several dummy news articles
describing a Court opinion on the constitutionality of an anti-terror
law that gave sweeping new powers to law enforcement. 199 Two
versions of the story reported that the Court upheld the law, while
two versions reported that it struck down the law as
unconstitutional; within each outcome pair, one story described
the Court’s decision-making in legalistic terms, while the other
described the same outcome in political terms. 200 The respective
characterizations were shown to influence the respondents’ views
of the Court’s actions. 201 The researchers found that
receiving information that [J]ustices bargain and compromise
produces more negative evaluations of Court procedures
relative to when the process is portrayed as guided largely by
legal factors. The results lend strong support for the notion that
there is an important link between how the media covers Court
decision-making and public perceptions and evaluations of the
institution. 202

However, the researchers further investigated the question
whether it “is . . . the presence of legalism or the absence of
197. Scheufele, supra note 189, at 107 (“To frame is to select some aspects of
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such
a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”).
198. Vanessa A. Baird & Amy Gangl, Shattering the Myth of Legality: The
Impact of the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of
Fairness, 27 POL. PSYCH. 597, 605 (2006).
199. See id. at 599–601 (describing the design and measures of the
experiment).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 603.
202. Id.
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political processes that matters for people’s
evaluations.” 203 The researchers concluded that the

fairness

[r]espondents who perceived that [J]ustices largely followed
legal procedures are much more likely to evaluate the process
as fair compared to those who did not perceive legal procedures
to be predominant in the deliberations, independent of the
outcome. Perceptions that [J]ustices bargain and compromise,
however, do not have a significant negative impact on
assessments of procedural fairness . . . . [S]ubjects reward the
Court for its perceived legalism but do not punish it when it is
perceived to bargain and compromise. 204

In other words, “it is not so much the perceived absence of
political wrangling among [J]ustices but . . . the presence of legal
guidelines [that drives] . . . the perception of fairness.” 205 What
appears crucial to public support is the public’s perception that the
Court is drawing on law foremost, and political intuitions only
secondarily, to resolve the disputes before it. 206 So, the mere
mention of politics is not fatal to public support. 207 On the other
hand, public loyalty seems to be jeopardized when the media
depicts the Justices as simply eschewing law in favor of politics. 208
The researchers concluded that, “if the media were consistently to
portray the Court as a site of political bargaining and compromise,
we might expect a decline in public support for the institution over
time.” 209
B. Media Framing of the Court and Its Work: The Known and the
Unknown
Given the social science literature indicating that news
reporting has the potential to influence the public’s attitudes
toward the Court, researchers have begun to examine how the
203. Id. at 604.
204. Id. at 605.
205. Id. at 597 (emphasis in original).
206. Id. at 603.
207. Id. at 605.
208. See id. at 607 (highlighting how public perception of the Court is
influenced by media coverage of judicial processes).
209. Id.
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press frames its accounts of the Court’s work. While ambitious,
these studies have thus far shed only a limited amount of light on
the subject, in part because the studies have sought to understand
whether coverage is “political,” but not whether the political has
drowned out the legal. Because research indicates that the
presence of legal narrative is more important than the absence of
political narrative in terms of creating public perceptions of the
Court, studies that do not compare the relative weight of each
narrative may be conceptually incomplete.
For example, one comprehensive eight-year study of daily
newspaper coverage of the Court was explicitly designed to
determine whether coverage was “political” or “apolitical,” and
concluded that it was the latter. 210 However, the study was
premised on an assumption that legal and political explanations of
the Court’s work were mutually exclusive. 211 Therefore, the coding
scheme called for every paragraph of coverage containing one or
more coded words to be designated as either political or apolitical,
even when the paragraph contained words representing both
concepts. 212 By utilizing this characterization on a paragraph basis
at the coding stage, rather than coding in a more granular fashion,
the study aimed at determining whether Supreme Court framing
was legal or political, without entertaining the possibility that it
could be both, and, moreover, that both aspects might appear in
the same paragraph. Further, because the study covered a
relatively short timeframe, it did not attempt to determine how
coverage conventions might have changed over time. Finally, some
of the words that were included in the coding bore a fairly loose or
inconclusive relationship with the concepts they were meant to
identify, raising the possibility that the study may have identified
as “legal” coverage some language that did not actually explain the
Court’s decision-making as a product of law-based reasoning. 213
210. See Nicholas LaRowe, On and Off the Supreme Court Beat: A Content
Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of the Supreme Court from 1997–2004, APSA
2010 ANN. MEETING PAPER 26 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court is in fact described
and discussed as an apolitical institution . . . .”).
211. Id. at 9–16.
212. Id. at 14.
213. For example, the “legal” words included references to laws and
constitutional provisions, but not to precedent. Further, the author coded as
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A more recent study, which reviewed articles in the New York
Times from the 1950s to the 2000s, asked whether “political”
framing had increased over that period. 214 The study confirmed
anecdotal suspicion that in recent years the press has increasingly
employed political language in its descriptions of the Court’s
work. 215 Between 1950 and 1959, the Times referred to some
Justices as “conservative” only twice and to others as “liberal” just
six times, whereas the paper referred to some Justices as
“conservative” 107 times, and to others as “liberal” 62 times,
between 2000 and 2009. 216 Similarly, references to the presidents
who appointed individual Justices appeared just 38 times from
1950 to 1959, but 76 times in coverage from 2000 to 2009. 217 The
study effectively documents an increasing incidence of political
framing at the Times. 218 However, while this inquiry was premised
on the somewhat incomplete theory that “political” descriptions of
the Court, without more, are damaging to the Court’s public
support, 219 research actually suggests that the public does not
withdraw support for the Court simply because it perceives that
political factors may have entered the decisional mix. Rather,
“legal” verbs that described the Court’s mechanisms for acting, such as rule,
affirm, certiorari, uphold, and strike down. Id. at 12. These words do not convey
any information about whether the Court’s decision resulted from legal factors,
so counting them as “legal” descriptions of the Court’s work may be unwarranted
and may weaken the soundness of the author’s finding that the media’s depiction
of the Court is more often “legal” than “political.”
214. Jones, supra note 10, at 619. And while New York Times references to
5–4 decisions rose during the fifty years studied, the upward trend was consistent
with the steady rise in the issuance of such closely divided decisions by the Court.
Id. at 626–27, 626–27 figs. 6 & 7. On the other hand, while the Court’s percentage
of unanimous opinions rose almost 10% during the fifty years studied, the
percentage of articles that mentioned unanimity declined during that same period
from about 2% to about 1%. Id. at 627–28, 627–28 figs. 8 & 9.
215. Id. at 629.
216. Id. at 621–22.
217. Id. at 624.
218. See generally id. Because it was restricted to a single newspaper’s
coverage of the Court’s changing docket, however, the validity of its insights may
be somewhat limited. See id. at 616 (explaining that the case study is limited to
the New York Times). For example, it does not account for the possibility that one
newspaper might have a distinctive or unique approach to reporting on the Court.
219. See id. at 617 (suggesting politicized explanations for Court decisions
erode public faith in the Court).
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research shows that support declines when the decisional mix is
shown to have inflated the significance of politics in a way that
crowds out consideration of law. Consequently, the rise of political
framing is significant only if it comes at the expense of legal
framing.
This question—whether political framing crowded out legal
framing—has been investigated in a project that tallied the
relative frequency of legal and political references in wire service
coverage. 220 Although the project was ambitious in conception, the
significance of its results was somewhat limited by the researchers’
coding protocol. Specifically, the words and phrases that
researchers selected to capture “legal” framing of the Court’s
decision-making tended to be terms of art used at the trial stage of
litigation, and were therefore unlikely to capture “legal”
explanations for the decision-making of an appellate court. 221
Moreover, the words and phrases that the researchers used to
capture “political” framing excluded many potentially significant
ones, such as “liberal,” “conservative,” “Democrat,” “Republican,”
“president” / “appoint” / “party.” 222 Accordingly, although this
study attempted to assess the relative weight given to the “legal”
and “political” frames in the Associated Press’s coverage of the
Court, the validity of its conclusions may be limited by the study
design. 223
220. See Johnson & Socker, supra note 177 (examining all Associated Press
coverage of the Court from 1979 to 2006).
221. See id. at 444 n.4 (listing “legal” words used in the study). The “legal”
words included several that were unlikely to arise in news coverage of the
Court—some by virtue of their being obsolete or outdated, and others by virtue of
their greater relevance to trial-level proceedings: affidavit, arraignment, bail,
caseload, case file, chambers, hearsay, high bench, in camera, inculpatory, marble
temple, pro tem, pro se, robes, tort, and the like. Id.
222. Id. at 444 n.5.
223. That said, the study found no steady upward or downward pattern in
“legal” linguistics during the relevant period. See id. at 455–56, 456 tbl.3
(presenting the data collected regarding the use of legal and political language).
Nor was there a discernable trajectory for “political” linguistics. Id. Further,
although the study tracked both “political” and “legal” framing, it did not
explicitly compare the relative strength of the political and legal frames within
stories or Court terms. A third study—often relied on by political scientists who
claim that journalists frame the Court’s work legally—also features a problematic
design that limits its reliability. Rorie L. Spill & Zoe M. Oxley, Philosopher Kings
or Political Actors? How the Media Portray the Supreme Court, 87 JUDICATURE 22,
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Social scientists have suggested that public loyalty to the
Court correlates with the public’s perceptions about how the Court
reaches its decisions. 224 According to these studies, the public’s
view of the Court remains positive so long as law appears to be a
primary driver, but destabilizes when ideology and political
calculation appear more influential. 225 Further, studies
demonstrate that media narratives have an important influence
on the public’s understanding about the factors that play a role in
judicial decision-making. 226 But there is little information
available on whether media narratives are mainly pitched towards
the legal or the political, and there is even less information
available on whether the direction of those narratives has changed
over the past several decades. It is difficult to apply social science
insights about the link between public perceptions of the Court’s
decision-making process and public loyalty to the institution
without having information about what frames the press has
actually used in recent history. All things considered, has the press
depicted the Court as doing law first, and politics second? Or has
it depicted the institution as privileging politics and relegating law
25 (2003). There, researchers coded television and newspaper stories on a single
(unnamed) Court case for references to case facts, case outcome, vote breakdown,
history of issue, and the Court’s “justifications” for its decision. Id. According to
the researchers, only two-thirds of the stories discussed the Court’s justification
for its outcome. Id. at 27. Although the study coded the Constitution, a statute,
legal precedent, legislative history, the Justices’ ideologies, the Justices’ personal
viewpoints, founder intent, and literalism as potential justifications, researchers
did not tally how many references to each of those justifications appeared within
any given story. Id. Instead, they reported only that the leading justifications
mentioned were the Constitution and a statute, with “few” mentions of ideology
or precedent. Id. While one could infer from this summary that journalists framed
the opinion as a product of “legal” decision-making, the brevity of the discussion,
the lack of detailed numerical findings, and the researchers’ failure to compare
the incidence of references to each of the coded justifications provide some basis
for questioning the utility of these findings.
224. See generally Baird & Gangl, supra note 199 (studying the impact of
media reports concerning the Court’s processes on public perceptions of the
Court); Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 60 (proposing that public perceptions of
the Court may be influenced by the model of judicial review that they believe the
Court’s members follow).
225. Baird & Gangl, supra note 199, at 607.
226. Id.; see Spill & Oxley, supra note 223 (discussing newspaper and
television coverage of the Court and its impact on the public).
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to a secondary role? And has that depiction changed over time? In
Part IV, we present the results of our study, which was designed
to investigate that question.
IV. The Evolution of Media Framing in Supreme Court Coverage
Our study attempts to assess the relative emphasis that
journalists have placed on legal and political explanations for
Supreme Court decision-making over a recent fifty-year period. We
do so by comparing the print-press coverage of two somewhat
similar, highly significant civil rights cases that were decided a
half century apart: Brown v. Board of Education and Parents
Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1. The two cases involved
variations of an important and highly controversial question: the
constitutionality of racial classifications in pupil assignment,
albeit in quite different contexts. 227 In Brown, the question
presented was whether the Constitution prohibited the
segregation of students by race, with the result that students of
color were relegated to separate schools as a matter of law. 228 In
Parents Involved, by contrast, the question was not whether school
officials could take race into account for the purpose of assigning
students to racially-segregated schools; the question was whether
a large urban public school district could take some notice of race
for the purpose of promoting racial balance within its various
attendance districts. 229
Our researchers pulled print media coverage of those cases
from a variety of national and local newspapers. They tracked the
227. The Brown case involved consolidated cases from Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware, all of which dealt with plaintiffs seeking
admission to public schools on a non-segregated basis. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 486–87 (1954). Notably, this case presented the opportunity to
reevaluate the “separate but equal” doctrine that the Court announced in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Id. at 488. The Parents Involved case involved
the consolidation of cases from the Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County,
Kentucky (Louisville), school districts; both cases involved pupil assignment
plans that depended in part on the use of racial classifications to maintain some
degree of racial balance. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 710 (2007).
228. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
229. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711.
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content of every story about the cases that appeared in those
newspapers from the respective announcements of impending
Supreme Court consideration to the announcements of the
decisions. They then coded words describing the Court’s
decision-making process in both “legal” and “political” terms.
Measuring the relative use of legal and political linguistics
indicated whether the thematic “frames” presented to readers
reinforced models of judicial review the public accepts as
legitimate or those it rejects as illegitimate.
We found that the Brown journalists explained the Court’s
decision-making in legal terms almost twice as often as they did in
political terms. 230 By contrast, the Parents Involved journalists
relied on political terms to explain the Court’s work almost as often
as they relied on legal terms. 231 Based on these two cases, it seems
that when it comes to press coverage of the Court’s work, the legal
frame that was decidedly dominant in the press coverage of Brown
no longer is. 232
A. Study Design
The study was designed to compare Supreme Court coverage
across two eras, namely, that of the “traditional” press and that of
the “modern” press. 233 We wished to focus on a legal subject with
broad public impact that was likely to be covered by the press and
consumed by the public. 234 Because of limited resources and the
lack of electronic databases for some newspapers—particularly,
230. See infra Part IV.B.
231. See infra Part IV.B.
232. See infra Part IV.C.
233. See Katherine Fink & Michael Schudson, The Rise of Contextual
Journalism, 1950s–2000s, 15 JOURNALISM 3, 13 fig. 1 (2014) (documenting a shift
from “conventional,” fact-based reporting at midcentury towards “contextual,”
interpretation-based reporting by the early twenty-first century).
234. In that respect, of course, our conclusions about press coverage of
Supreme Court cases are necessarily limited to high profile, salient cases. Press
coverage necessarily varies with the perceived salience of the issues presented,
and, of the thousands of cases that the Supreme Court will have decided during
the period between Brown and Parents Involved, it is a fair assumption that many
cases received no press coverage at all.
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but not exclusively, with respect to earlier periods and more local
newspapers—we decided to limit our inquiry to an in-depth study
of the press’s coverage of two significant, representative cases. We
also wished to identify two cases in which there would be sufficient
local and national press coverage to permit consideration of
both. 235 Further, the relevant issue had to be one that was
presented in cases arising during both eras, in order to minimize
the possibility that any differences in press coverage were due, not
to changes over time in the way in which the press approaches
cases, but to differences in the issues and their respective degrees
of perceived salience.
We selected the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education and
the 2007 case of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1. Brown posed the question whether legally
imposed racial segregation in public education violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 236 Parents
Involved posed the question whether some limited efforts by school
officials to increase racial diversity in individual schools violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 237 The two cases have been described
235. Although we initially considered the inclusion of non-print media in our
study, we soon determined that such a project was not practicable, not only
because of resource support issues, but also because primary materials relating
to non-print media coverage of the Supreme Court were not readily available (if
available at all), and that was particularly the case with respect to Brown. Even
with respect to print media, we found that there was no single electronic database
on which to draw for all the newspapers we wished to study, and some papers
were not digitized at all. Our research therefore necessarily included searching
microform and microfiche records for some newspapers. In some cases, local
newspapers had neither electronic nor print archives, and we were able to
research relevant editions of those newspapers only because of the kind
assistance of public libraries in the relevant geographical areas. Other
newspapers were simply unavailable.
236. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1953) (“The plaintiffs
contended that segregated public schools are not ‘equal’ and cannot be made
‘equal,’ and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws.”).
The Court decided a companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause, because it involved the District of Columbia, rather than
a state. 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). The press essentially treated the two cases
as one.
237. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 711 (2007) (“Both cases present the same underlying legal question–whether
a public school that had not operated legally segregated schools or has been found
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as having a “doctrinal and moral equivalence,” but they are
temporally remote from one another, allowing us to compare two
instances of press coverage fifty years apart. 238
For each case, two sets of newspapers were identified: leading
national newspapers, and local newspapers in the state or states
where the cases arose. 239 For each case, the key events in the
chronology of the Supreme Court litigation were identified, and a
multi-day window preceding and following each key event date was
to be unitary may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that
classification in making school assignments.”).
238. Cedrick Merlin Powell, Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racialism, 53
WASHBURN L.J. 451, 460 (2014) (citing Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV.
1589, 1605 (2009)). It is also the case, of course, that Parents Involved did not
garner the same degree of attention from the press or the public that the Brown
litigation engendered. That may well be understandable. Brown was understood
from the beginning to be a case of momentous importance, regardless of how it
was to be decided. Id. at 451. Parents Involved may not have seemed equally
momentous, but many civil rights scholars would have considered it to be a very
serious threat to the “anti-subordination” understanding of Brown. See, e.g., Reva
B. Siegel, supra note 110, at 1474–75 (discussing two views as to the central
meaning of Brown). Nonetheless, the case received less attention in the press than
might have been expected.
239. Specifically, the national newspapers studied for Brown were the Atlanta
Journal Constitution, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, the New York
Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington
Post. The local newspapers studied for Brown were the Charleston (S.C.) News &
Courier, the Richmond Times Dispatch, the Roanoke Times, the Topeka Daily
Capital, the Virginian Pilot, the Wichita Eagle, and the Wilmington Morning
News. The same seven national newspapers were studied for Parents Involved.
The relevant local newspapers for Parents Involved were the Louisville
Courier-Journal, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, and the Seattle Times. Although
some local newspapers contained original reporting, many relied, at least in part,
on national wire service coverage. The project originally aimed to investigate
possible differences between national and local coverage, but the use of national
wire service sources by local newspapers made it difficult to pursue that
comparison in a meaningful way. As television networks did not yet feature
regular “nightly news” broadcasts when Brown was decided, the study did not
attempt to capture television news. See CHARLES L. PONCE DE LEON, THAT’S THE
WAY IT IS: A HISTORY OF TELEVISION NEWS IN AMERICA 65–66 (2015) (describing
the rise of evening news programs in the 1960s). The study design originally
contemplated including Court coverage by online-only outlets, but after
identifying the highest-traffic sites on both sides of the political spectrum, our
researchers documented very uneven coverage of the Court. Some sites regularly
reported on the Court, while others virtually ignored it. Any inferences to be
drawn from such an imperfect dataset were thought likely to be unreliable, so
online coverage was excluded from the study.
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identified. 240 Within those calendar windows, the selected
newspapers were searched to locate any stories on the relevant
case. For Brown, a total of twenty-six days were identified in this
way. For Parents Involved, a total of eleven days were identified.
These days are referred to in this Article as “story days.” Some
newspapers were available on searchable databases, such as
ProQuest; others were available only on microfiche, which was not
automatically searchable. For searchable databases, a set of search
words was entered, and a universe of articles was returned; for
non-searchable databases, a research assistant read each page of
the relevant newspaper on microfiche to locate relevant articles.
The large universe of articles that resulted from this search
was then split into two categories: “primary” coverage consisted of
news articles that directly referenced the activity of the Supreme
Court in relation to a case. These articles might, for example,
summarize the oral arguments held before the Court or explain
that the Court had decided to hear the case. “Secondary” coverage
discussed the cases without specifically providing the public with
any new information about Court activity on the case. This
coverage might, for example, include commentary or editorials
related to the case, or articles limited to summarizing the reactions
to developments in the case by certain public figures or
constituencies. Our study was limited to “primary” coverage
articles.
A coding outline was developed to identify various linguistic
categories that would capture relevant concepts. The goal of coding
article content was to develop an empirical understanding of the
relative journalistic weight given to “legal” explanations of the
Court’s behavior as opposed to “political” explanations.
Specifically, to identify legal explanations, coders identified all
mentions of constitutional provisions, legislation (federal, state,
local, and international), and Supreme Court precedents. These
words were thought to signal factors internal to law and are
240. The relevant Brown events were the setting of oral arguments in the
consolidated state cases, the first oral argument, the order calling for reargument,
the second oral argument, and the decision announcement. The relevant Parents
Involved dates were the grant of certiorari, the oral argument, and the decision
announcement. An appendix summarizing the daily coding results in PDF format
is on file with the authors and available upon request.
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therefore indicative of a “pure legal” model of judicial
decision-making.
To identify political explanations of the Court’s work, the
coders identified and coded two kinds of language. First, all
mentions of a Justice’s appointing president, political party
affiliation, and ideology were coded. 241 In our discussion below, we
refer to this language as “internal political” language, as it
suggests considerations that are not commands internal to law but
also are not considerations entirely exogenous to the Court.
Second, coders recorded mentions of any person who was not a
Justice or a party or a lawyer directly involved in the case. Coding
these mentions was not as straightforward as one might expect.
For example, the coding protocol called for all amici curiae to be
classified as third parties. In the Brown case, of course, the United
States was technically an amicus curiae, although, at least in
terms of the District of Columbia component of the litigation, its
function was effectively that of a litigant; the United States played
a prominent role in the overall litigation, and it might just as
plausibly have been classified as a “litigant.” Pursuant to the
“amicus curiae” convention, mentions of the United States were
therefore counted as “third-party” mentions, which may have
artificially inflated the count of “third-party” mentions in coverage
of the case. These “third-party mentions” are referred to below as
“external political,” as they suggest considerations that are not
internal to law or to the Court or its personnel. 242

241. Despite our misgivings about what precisely political scientists mean
when they refer to a Justice’s “ideology,” the most commonly used understanding
of “ideology” in the literature is the liberal-conservative scale employed by the
Segal-Cover score. See, e.g., Epstein & Mershon, supra note 65, at 263–65.
Consequently, we coded for references to the Justices as liberal or conservative.
242. See infra Part IV.B.1. Some individuals also could be characterized in
several ways. For example, the coders classified Governor Byrnes of South
Carolina as a third-party commentator, but he was also a former Justice of the
Supreme Court and the governor of a state whose school systems were targets of
the litigation. Because Governor Byrnes was not technically a party to the case,
and despite the fact that he was a former Supreme Court Justice, it seemed most
appropriate to classify him as a third-party commentator. Like the question
involving the classification of the United States, this question clearly was a close
one. The statistical effect of these choices is insignificant, but the opposite choices
would, if anything, have increased the magnitude of the difference between the
two cases in terms of the press’s focus on political versus legal factors.
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In addition to these categories, coders also recorded all
mentions of individual Justices in the coverage of a case. The
categorical significance of these mentions can be viewed in two
ways. One could categorize Justice mentions as neutral facts
necessary to accurate reportage. However, one could also
categorize them as having political weight when they are invoked
in connection with a description of judicial coalitions or with regard
to the formulation of intra-curial strategy. For that reason, we offer
below alternate calculations of “political” language: one that does
not include mentions of individual Justices, and one that does
include those mentions. Finally, coders recorded any time in a
news story that a journalist quoted from legal briefs filed with the
Court; quoted direct statements of a Justice or party to the case
(most frequently during oral argument); or quoted from the
opinions in the cases.
B. Study Results—Numeric
The relative use of legal and political terms to describe the
Court’s work shifted significantly between Brown and Parents
Involved. Most strikingly, the ratio of legal to political references
to the Court’s behavior has changed significantly, with the
midcentury press’s law-leaning depiction giving way to a more
politics-oriented depiction fifty years later. Further, the
contemporary journalists focused more on individual Justices than
on the Court as a unitary institution. 243 In addition, the study
found that contemporary reporters are far less likely to transmit
the Court’s work directly to the public by reprinting opinions,
243. See infra Part IV.B.1.c. Undoubtedly, some of the difference may be
explained by the fact that Brown was a unanimous decision, while Parents
Involved was badly splintered, and also by the fact that all of the Brown Justices
(with the exception of the Chief Justice) had been appointed by Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman, while the composition of the Parents Involved Court was
more diverse in terms of appointing presidents. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text (discussing the respective compositions of the Court during
the periods in which these cases were decided). As previously noted, however, the
Warren Court was diverse in different ways, and that diversity was reflected both
in the questions the Justices asked at the Brown oral arguments and in their
previous decisions. See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text. In addition,
the unanimity with which Brown ultimately was decided was not foreseeable
while the proceeding was ongoing. Id.
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quoting from those opinions, or quoting statements at oral
argument. Instead, they now paraphrase the Justices and directly
quote representatives of third-party advocacy groups who evaluate
the Court’s work, often in terms of their own preferred political
outcomes.
1. Legal References Versus Political References
The Brown coverage described the factors relevant to the
Court’s work in primarily “legal” language. On the other hand, the
Parents Involved coverage describes the Court’s work more often
in “political” language. For purposes of this section, “legal”
language includes references to legal texts, including the
Constitution or any of its provisions; any Court precedent; or any
statute under review in a given case. As a general matter,
“political” language can be roughly divided into two categories. The
first involves explicitly political descriptions of individual Justices,
such as information about their appointing president, political
affiliation, or ideology. These have been labelled “internal political”
references. The second category of political language involves
references to ideologically motivated people or groups outside of
the case itself, such as lobbying or advocacy groups, government
officials who were not directly involved in the case, and “public
intellectuals.” These have been labeled “external political”
references.
a. Legal Versus Internal Political
The comparative weight given to legal references and internal
political references shifted noticeably from Brown to Parents
Involved. While the incidence of “internal political” references rose
markedly from the first case to the second, the gross number of
legal references exceeded that of “internal political” references in
the coverage of both cases.
The Constitution, statutes, and case precedents were
referenced 1659 times over the entirety of the Brown coverage
studied. Throughout that same coverage, individual Justices’
appointing presidents, political party affiliation, and ideology were
referenced twenty-nine times. In other words, the ratio of “legal”
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to “internal political” references in the Brown coverage was about
57:1.
The Constitution, statutes, and case precedents were
referenced 745 times over the entirety of the Parents Involved
coverage. Throughout that same coverage, the Justices’ appointing
presidents, political party affiliation, and ideology were referenced
158 times. In other words, the ratio of “legal” to “internal political”
references was about 5:1.
b. The Rise of “External Political” References
To locate “external political” references, coders recorded
mentions of any parties who were not Justices, litigants, or
attorneys representing litigants. This “third-party” category
included those who had filed amicus curiae briefs in the case, 244
outside interest groups, government officials with no direct role in
the case, and “public intellectuals” such as law professors. 245
Unlike the “internal political” references to individual Justices
as politically motivated decision-makers, these references go
beyond indicating to readers that the Supreme Court
decision-making process is infused with the values and beliefs held
by the Justices as members of the Court. The attitudinal theory of
judging essentially holds that the Justices’ decision-making is
244. Generally speaking, many more amicus curiae briefs are filed today than
was the case during the Brown era. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill,
The Influence of Amicus Brief on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743,
751– 52 (2000) (discussing increased incidence of amicus filings over time). In
Brown, only nine amicus briefs (including two by the United States) were filed.
See generally 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975). In Parents Involved, the dockets reflect that a total of 116 amicus
briefs were filed in the two consolidated cases. Docket Sheet, Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908),
https://perma.cc/8DXE-4D97 (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Docket Sheet, Meredith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-915), https://perma.cc/BNX2-UKJM (last
visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
245. See THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL: BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS xi
(Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger and Richard M. Zinman eds., 2003)
(defining “public intellectuals” as “a class of hybrid beings standing with one foot
in the contemplative world and the other in the political”); see also Arthur Austin,
The Law Academy and the Public Intellectual, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 243
(2003) (discussing Judge Richard Posner’s concept of the public intellectual).
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motivated by preferred political outcomes and influences external
to law. As previously noted, one conspicuous possible cause for the
public’s loss of faith in the Court’s institutional competence is the
perception that the Justices’ decision-making process is driven
more by outcome preference than by legal reasoning. These
“third-party” references often describe the merits of the competing
viewpoints in terms of political outcomes. The people and interest
groups mentioned often correlate strongly with the leading
political parties and are wholly exogenous to the Court and its
members. Consequently, we categorized these mentions as
“external political” language. “External political” language was
first tallied in its own freestanding category. It was then added to
“internal political” language to compare the overall ratio of legal to
political explanations of the Court’s work within the press coverage
of the two cases.
In 199 total Brown stories, there were 898 “external political”
mentions, or an average of 4.5 such mentions per individual story.
In sixty-two total Parents Involved stories, there were 555 such
mentions, or an average of 8.9 such mentions per individual story.
In other words, there was a 99% increase in such mentions per
story between Brown and Parents Involved. For twenty-six Brown
story days, there were 898 external political references, or 34.5
references per story day. For eleven Parents Involved story days,
there were 555 external political references, or 50.5 per story day.
In other words, there was a 46% increase in external political
references per story day.
c. Institutional Versus Individual Coverage
This evolving depiction of the Court as a collection of
individuals presumably driven by subjective policy preferences, as
opposed to an institution constrained by objective legal commands,
is reinforced by the media’s references to individual Justices in its
reportage.
Comparing references to individual Justices in the two cases
is complex for several reasons. Most important, Brown was a
unanimous decision, while Parents Involved was decided by a 5– 4
vote, featuring two dissenting opinions as well as a separate
concurring opinion. Consequently, it is inevitable that the overall
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coverage of Parents Involved would require more mentions of
individual Justices simply to report the identities and respective
views of the several opinion writers. It might be expected that the
inclusion of stories covering the opinion announcements in the case
is likely to skew the statistics for this reason, and that is indeed
the case. If one compares all the stories covering Brown with all
the stories covering Parents Involved, one finds 526 references to
individual Justices over twenty-six story days (20.23 references
per day) in Brown, compared with 1062 references to the
individual Justices over eleven story days (96.55 references per
day) in Parents Involved. If one compares only pre-decisional story
days in the two cases (and thereby removes the most obvious
possible explanation for the difference), however, one finds that the
number of references to individual Justices in Parents Involved
still greatly exceeds the number of such references in Brown, albeit
less dramatically so. Notably, even once the data are stripped of
decision-day reporting—where law-based factors such as a split
decision can be expected to yield a higher number of individual
Justice references—there remains a significant increase in such
references between the two cases. For Brown, there were 375
pre-decisional references to individual Justices over twenty-three
story days (16.3 references per day), compared to 208 such
references over six days (34.7 references per day) in Parents
Involved. 246 In sum, pre-decision-day coverage by itself saw a 113%
increase in individual Justice mentions from Brown to Parents
Involved. 247
246. To the extent that the Court’s rate of split decisions increases, this may
reflect an increasingly politicized institution, so that coverage ignoring that
dynamic would be inaccurate or at least incomplete. Further, studies suggest that
split votes generate both a greater net number of news stories concerning the
decision than do cases decided by unanimous votes, and that they are covered
more “negatively,” or in ways that indicated they might be disadvantageous to
some Americans. See MICHAEL A. ZILLS, THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY, DISSENTING
OPINIONS, MEDIA COVERAGE, AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 49–76 (2015).
247. One might also look exclusively to press coverage of oral argument to test
the relative distribution of individual Justice mentions. That might make sense
because the Justices’ work in asking questions is by definition conducted
individually. In addition, the incidence of individual references would not be
influenced by the eventual vote and any differences in media convention would
necessarily reflect dynamics other than those related to rates of judicial
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Figure 1

disagreement. On the other hand, Brown was argued for multiple days in 1953
and then set for a re-argument in 1954, when the arguments again encompassed
multiple days. 347 U.S. at 483. Parents Involved, in contrast, followed a more
orthodox single-day, single-argument format. 551 U.S. at 701. Not surprisingly,
the study found a far greater number of oral argument stories in connection with
Brown, and a straight numerical comparison of references to individual Justices
would likely be misleading for that reason. Instead, to get an apt comparison of
the individual Justice mentions for each case, we have calculated the average
number of references to individual Justices per oral argument story. Using these
measures, the study nonetheless found that media emphasis on individual
Justices rose significantly from one case to the other. We located a total of
ninety-one stories on Brown’s two multi-day sets of oral argument. Within those
ninety-one stories, individual Justices were mentioned a total of 304 times. In
other words, each story mentioned individual Justices an average of 3.34 times.
We located a total of sixteen stories on Parents Involved’s single, partial day of
oral argument. Within those sixteen stories, individual Justices were mentioned
a total of 152 times. In other words, each story mentioned individual Justices an
average of 9.5 times. Thus, media mentions of individual Justices during oral
argument rose 184 percent between the two cases. An additional factor to be
considered in evaluating this data, of course, is the fact that the Justices are likely
to have been more active questioners in 2006 than they were at the time of Brown,
which might also be expected to result in a greater number of individual Justice
mentions in connection with oral argument coverage. See Sullivan & Canty, supra
note 32, at 1042.
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Figure 2
To be clear, we do not contend that mentioning individual
Justices amounts to an explicit suggestion that the Court’s work is
simply the product of politics. It is also not analogous to references
to third-party political advocacy groups, which implicitly suggest
that the Court’s work may be influenced by external political
considerations. At the same time, it is impossible to discount the
possibility that media emphasis on individual Justices has
contributed to public perceptions of the Court as an institution
whose members pursue personal preferences and engage in
political contestation. 248 And it almost certainly detracts from
public perceptions of the Court as an institution whose members
can be expected to work together in a lawyer-like way to arrive at
agreed legal conclusions for objective reasons based on shared
texts such as the Constitution or case precedents.

248.

See infra Part IV.B.5.
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d. Legal Versus Political Overall
When the entirety of “political” language is compared with the
entirety of “legal” language used in the coverage of the two sample
cases, a substantial shift in emphasis between the legal and the
political is evident.
As mentioned above, we offer two different calculations based
on two possible definitions of “political.” In one model, “external
political” language describing outside actors’ views of a case is
added to “internal political” language describing the “policy priors”
that individual Justices bring to a case. This overall “political”
total can then be compared with the “legal” total to yield a ratio of
“legal” to “political” language used by the media in describing the
two cases.
In the Brown coverage, there were 1659 total “legal”
references and 927 total “political” references. In other words, in a
universe of 2586 references to factors influencing the Court’s
decision-making, about 64% were “legal” and 36% were “political.”
Throughout the Parents Involved coverage, in contrast, there were
745 total “legal” references and 713 total “political” references. In
a universe of 1458 references to factors influencing the Court’s
decision-making, about 51% were “legal,” and 49% were “political.”
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Figure 3
In an alternate model, “political” was defined to include
references to judicial background, third-party mentions, and to the
individual justices themselves. Using this model, in Brown, there
were 1659 total legal references, and 1453 total political
references. In a universe of 3112 total references in Brown, 53%
were legal, and 47% were political. In Parents Involved, there were
745 total legal references and 1775 total political references. In a
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universe of 2520 references in Parents Involved, 30% were legal,
and 70% were political.

Figure 4
Broadly speaking, the Brown journalists depicted the Court as
an institution primarily concerned with honoring internal legal
principles in its decision-making. The Parents Involved journalists,
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by contrast, depict the Court as an institution more substantially
influenced by external political principles in its decision-making.
In both cases, press coverage identified roles for both law and
politics, but the Brown coverage treated political concerns as
secondary to law, while the Parents Involved coverage assumed a
far more substantial role for the Justices’ political preferences or
those of outside constituencies.
2. Direct Versus Filtered Coverage
A final comparison between the language used by journalists
to describe actions in the two cases is worth noting. Coverage of
the Brown case included 2178 direct quotations from the opinion,
legal briefs, and oral statements made by the Justices, the parties,
and counsel for the respective parties. Based on a total of 199
stories studied, there was an average of 10.94 quotations per
individual story from legal documents or direct case participants.
Coverage of the Parents Involved case included 472 such direct
quotations. Based on a total of sixty-two total stories, there was an
average of 7.61 such direct quotes per individual story. In other
words, the number of direct quotations from legal briefs, opinions,
and people directly involved in the cases per story dropped about
30.4% from one case to the other. When direct quotation coverage
is calculated by story day, the drop is even more dramatic. In
Brown, there were 83.77 such quotations per story day, whereas in
Parents Involved, there were 42.9 such quotations per story day,
amounting to a roughly 50% drop in direct quotation coverage
between the two cases.
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Further, the Brown journalists were far more likely to
transmit the Court’s actual work to the public. Of the seven
national newspapers studied, 249 five reprinted the full text of the
Brown decision. 250 None of those same seven newspapers reprinted
the full text of the Parents Involved decision. Just three (the New
York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times)
printed short excerpts. Of the six local newspapers studied in
Brown, 251 five reprinted the full opinion text. 252 In contrast, of the
three local newspapers studied in Parents Involved, 253 none
reprinted the full opinion text. One, the Seattle Times, reprinted
excerpts. 254
249. New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles
Times, Chicago Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle, and Atlanta Journal
Constitution.
250. Text of Supreme Court Decision Outlawing Negro Segregation in the
Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 15; Text of Opinion on Schools in
States, WASH. POST, May 18, 1954, at 4; Text of Court Ruling on School
Segregation, S.F. CHRON., May 18, 1954, at 14; Supreme Court’s Decision in U.S.
School Segregation Cases, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 1954, at 8; Text of Supreme Court’s
Ruling on School Segregation, ATLANTA J. CONST., May 18, 1954, at 10.
251. Charleston News Courier, Roanoke Times, Wilmington Morning News,
Wichita Eagle, Richmond Times Dispatch, and Virginian Pilot.
252. Text of Supreme Court’s Ruling in School Segregation Case, RICH. TIMES
DISPATCH, May 18, 1954, at 8; Text of Supreme Court’s Ruling Which Declared
Segregated Schools Illegal, VA. PILOT, May 18, 1954, at 12; Text of Supreme Court
Decision on School Segregation, WILMINGTON MORNING NEWS, May 18, 1954, at 5;
Segregation Decision Text, ROANOKE TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 15; Full Text of
Supreme Court’s Segregation Decision, CHARLESTON NEWS COURIER, May 18,
1954, at 11.
253. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Seattle Times, and Louisville Courier Journal.
254 Chief Justice Warren later observed that he had wanted the Court to
issue a short opinion in Brown, in part because he wanted to maximize the
likelihood that it would be published in general circulation newspapers, so that
people could read it. See EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 3 (1977)
(“It was not a long opinion, for I had written it so it could be published in the daily
press throughout the nation without taking too much space.”). Interestingly,
veteran Supreme Court correspondents Fred Graham and Joe Mathewson have
noted that Chief Justice Warren was not generally mindful of the needs of the
press or its dependence on the Court with respect to accurate reporting: “Chief
Justice Earl Warren, unusual among justices in that he had faced the electorate
many times and was highly experienced in public communication, was
nevertheless indifferent to the Court’s reliance on the news media to tell the
citizenry of its decisions.” MATHEWSON, supra note 184, at 363. Quoting from Fred
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C. Study Results—Narrative
The statistical results of the study suggest a shift in the
direction of press coverage, from one that principally was
concerned with legal issues to one that is at least equally concerned
with a political framing of the Court’s work. This impression is
reinforced by examining narrative examples from the coverage
itself.
1. Legal Descriptions of the Court in Brown
Coverage of the Brown case relied heavily on reporter
explanations of the constitutional provisions and precedents that
provided the relevant decisional framework for the issue at hand.
For example, the New York Times October 9, 1952 story on the
consolidation of the Brown cases included a total of eight legal
references. 255 Three references described the state and local
segregation statutes under review. 256 Three described the relevant
precedent: one of these named Plessy v. Ferguson, 257 a second
explained the holding in Plessy that “‘separate but equal’ facilities
satisfied demands to strike down [historical] segregation statutes,”
and the third explained that in the Brown case, the NAACP was
arguing that “the ‘separate but equal’ thesis is obnoxious and
contravenes the constitutional guarantees for protection of all
citizens.” 258 Two additional references were to the Constitution:
Graham’s memoir, they note that, “‘As the figurehead and moving force behind a
Court that was upsetting applecarts throughout the country,’ Chief Justice
Warren ‘made a point of being oblivious to the outcry that it created. He was the
Rhett Butler of judicial public relations; frankly, he didn’t give a damn.’” Id. The
opinion in Brown was short, even for its time, but, as a general matter, the length
of Supreme Court opinions has increased greatly since the early 1950s. See, e.g.,
Ryan E. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of
Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 634 (2008) (stating the length of
Court majority opinions has quintupled between the first period and most recent
period analyzed in the study).
255. Lewis Wood, High Court Defers School Bias Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1952, at 12.
256. Id.
257. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
258. Id.
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one referred to the “guarantees for protection of all citizens,” while
the other explicitly referred to the Fourteenth Amendment. 259
Stories on the two lengthy rounds of oral argument in Brown
were also replete with references to legal concepts. For example,
the New York Times’s coverage of the first day of oral arguments
on December 9, 1952, included nine references to the state and
local statutes under review and ten references to the Constitution
and its provisions. 260 Specifically, the reporter referred to the
“Federal Constitution” twice; to the “Fourteenth Amendment” five
times; to the Equal Protection Clause or equality of civil rights
twice; and to the “constitution” once. 261
In the Times’s coverage of the second day of the 1952 oral
argument, there were ten references to state, local, and
international laws; ten references to the Constitution and its
provisions; and two references to precedent. 262 The references to
the Constitution included two mentions of the Constitution
itself. 263 Several references to the Fourteenth Amendment
endeavored to explain the nature of that provision. 264 For example,
the reporter wrote that NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall 265
259. Id.
260. Luther A. Huston, Supreme Court Asked to End School Segregation in
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1952, at 1.
261. Id. Huston was already a seasoned reporter when he was assigned to
cover the Supreme Court in 1951. See Luther A. Huston, Ex-Reporter Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1975, at 36
Assigned, again at his request, to the Supreme Court in 1951, Mr.
Huston reported the historic school‐segregation case, not only from the
court but also in the battlefield of the Southern and border states.
Walter White, then executive secretary of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, described Mr. Huston’s summary
of the cases as “brilliant,” and Mr. Huston received the George Polk
Memorial Award for his coverage of the story in 1954.
262. Luther A. Huston, Segregation Held Legislative Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 1952, at 1.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., id. (“Segregation is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which forbids any abridgement by the states of the rights of United
States citizens.”).
265. Marshall would later become a judge of the Second Circuit, Solicitor
General, and, ultimately, a Justice of the Supreme Court. See generally WIL
HAYGOOD, SHOWDOWN: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2016); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD
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had stated that “[s]egregation is unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any abridgement by the
states of the rights of United States citizens.” 266 In other words,
the reporter summarized Marshall’s constitutional argument in
terms of the language of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The
reporter also referred to the Fourteenth Amendment in
summarizing a line of questions regarding whether Congress,
rather than the Court, would be better positioned to set public
policy on segregation. 267 He reported that Spottswood Robinson III,
another of the NAACP lawyers, was skeptical that “Congress could
adopt legislation, under the Fourteenth Amendment, that would
remedy the situation.” 268 Finally, the reporter summarized the
argument of John W. Davis, the Wall Street lawyer and former
Solicitor General who was counsel for the South Carolina
parties; 269 Davis argued that segregation was “set up under” the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Reconstruction Congress
permitted it in the District of Columbia schools, which it was
responsible for overseeing. 270 The reporter also referred to other
constitutional provisions in his story, explaining that the segment
of the case challenging the District of Columbia segregation policy
did not arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, but under Article
I of the Constitution “which defines the powers of Congress, and
[under] the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . because
the District of Columbia is under Federal rule.” 271
Similarly intricate references to governing law are found in
the December 9, 1953 coverage of the last day of the second round
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998).
266. Huston, supra note 262, at 1.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id. Davis was nearing the end of a distinguished career. A native of West
Virginia, he had been a law professor at Washington and Lee University, a
congressman from West Virginia, Solicitor General of the United States, an
ambassador to Great Britain, an unsuccessful Democratic presidential candidate,
a powerful Supreme Court advocate, and a successful Wall Street lawyer. See
generally WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS
(1973).
270. Huston, supra note 262, at 1.
271. Id.
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of oral arguments. 272 The New York Times story on that day
included ten legal references. 273 Of these, three were to the
segregation statutes under review. 274 Three were to Court
precedent. 275 Of these, one stated that the Justices were being
asked to “set aside a doctrine, laid down by the Supreme Court,
nearly sixty years ago, that school segregation is not
unconstitutional if equal facilities are provided for each race.” 276 A
second summarized a party’s argument that “the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ facilities [was] laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1897 [and] had been used
since that time to perpetuate unconstitutional practices and
should now be set aside.” 277 A third paraphrased attorneys for the
states who called Plessy “sound doctrine” and said “that the high
court lacked judicial power to invalidate the doctrine.” 278 One
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment stated that it “forbids any
states to make or enforce laws that infringe on the rights or
privileges of any citizen of the United States.” 279 Another reference
summarized the NAACP position that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s purpose was “to abolish segregation in the public
schools and ‘wipe out the last vestige of slavery.’” 280 A third
summarized John W. Davis’s position that, “it was not the intent
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress in passing the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1866 and submitting it to the states that it then, or
at any future time, would outlaw school segregation.” 281
Frequent and expository references to legal concepts are also
found in the coverage of the Court’s actual opinion rejecting school
segregation. In its story on the opinion announcement, the New
York Times included thirty-one references to the Constitution, case
272. Luther A. Huston, School Bias Arguments End; High Court Will Rule
Later, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1953, at 1.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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precedents, or relevant statutes. 282 Of those, seventeen references
were to constitutional provisions and eleven were to precedents. 283
The article quoted the opinion’s statement that segregation
“deprived Negroes of ‘the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” 284 It also explained that while the
Fourteenth Amendment determined the constitutionality of the
state statutes at issue, the Fifth Amendment governed the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia policy because the
District was a federal enclave subject to the jurisdiction of
Congress. 285 The article went on to explain that “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no state shall ‘deny to any person within
the jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’” and that the
Fifth Amendment provides that “no person shall be ‘deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.’” 286
One lengthy passage in the May 18 New York Times article
summarized the relevant constitutional history and doctrine:
[Attorneys for the students had argued] that segregation, of
itself, was unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment,
which was adopted July 28, 1868, was intended to wipe out the
last vestige of inequality between the races, the Negro side
argued. Against this, lawyers representing the states argued
that since there was no specific constitutional prohibition
against segregation of the schools, it was a matter for the states,
under their police powers, to decide. The Supreme Court
rejected the “states rights” doctrine, however, and found all
laws ordering or permitting segregation in the schools to be in
conflict with the Federal Constitution. 287

In addition, the reporter gave detailed information about
Plessy v. Ferguson, the relevant precedent in the case. One long
passage explained that:
The “separate but equal” doctrine demolished by the Supreme
Court today involved transportation, not education. It was the
282. See Luther A. Huston, ‘Separate but Equal’ Doctrine Held Out of Place in
Education, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 1.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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case of Plessy vs. Ferguson, decided in 1866. The court then held
that segregation was not unconstitutional if equal facilities
were provided for each race. Since that ruling six cases have
been before the Supreme Court, applying the doctrine to public
education. In several cases, the court has ordered the admission
to colleges and universities of Negro students on the ground
that equal facilities were not available in segregated
institutions. Today, however, the court held the doctrine
inapplicable under any circumstances to public education. 288

2. Political References to the Court in Brown
The “political” references in the same set of Brown stories are
few in number and fairly dry. For example, the New York Times
story on the consolidation of the Brown cases for purposes of oral
argument contains no references to judicial political affiliations or
ideology and no third-party advocates commenting on the case. 289
In the three selected stories covering the various oral argument
days, there are no references to judicial ideology and only eight
references to third parties. 290 Of those eight references, three
summarized the federal government’s arguments to the Court as
amicus curiae, and three summarized the Eisenhower
administration’s position on the desirability of segregated schools
in the District of Columbia. One quoted South Carolina Governor
(and former Supreme Court Justice) James F. Byrnes, who
“suggested that if the [Court] [held] segregation to be violative of
the Federal Constitution, South Carolina should abolish its public
school system.” 291 The final third-party reference described a
woman who waited in line to hear the second day of oral
arguments. 292 The story on the opinion handed down in Brown
288. Id.
289. See Wood, supra note 255, at 12 (reporting on the Court’s decision to
postpone oral argument for certain school segregation cases).
290. Huston (Dec. 9, 1952), supra note 260, at 1; Huston (Dec. 11, 1952), supra
note 262, at 1; Huston (Dec. 10, 1953), supra note 272, at 1.
291. Huston (Dec. 10, 1952), supra note 260, at 1.
292. See Huston (Dec. 11, 1952), supra note 262, at 1 (“Mrs. Helen W. Hobart,
Dean of Women and Associate Professor of Psychology at Roanoke College, Va.,
was waiting when the doors of the Supreme Court Building were opened this
morning.”).
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contains no “internal political” mentions regarding judicial
background or ideology, and just five references to third parties. 293
Three of the latter were to the Supreme Court press officer’s efforts
to move the media into the courtroom for the announcement. 294
Two others were references to states that had announced they
would abolish the public schools if required to desegregate. 295
In addition to the main story on the announcement of the
Brown opinion, the New York Times ran a brief sidebar that
explicitly was “internal political.” Taken from the Associated Press
wire, 296 it stated in its entirety:
Five of the nine Supreme Court Justices who today outlawed
race segregation in public schools were appointees of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Three were named to the Court by
President Truman and one by President Eisenhower. Here is
the line-up: Chief Justice Earl Warren, a Californian, named by
President Eisenhower. Justices Hugo Black (Alabama), Stanley
F. Reed (Kentucky), Felix Frankfurter (born in Austria with a
New York-Massachusetts adult background), William O.
Douglas (born in Minnesota, resident of Washington State), and
Robert H. Jackson (born in Pennsylvania, resident of New York
State)—named by President Roosevelt. Justices Harold H.
Burton (born in Massachusetts, resident of Ohio), Tom C. Clark
(Texas) and Sherman Minton (Indiana)—named by President
Truman. 297

The geographical references may be suggestive of the
individual Justices’ respective degrees of familiarity with Southern
Jim Crow laws. Notably, the story simply provided the
information, with no elaboration as to how the Justices’
backgrounds might have influenced their work on the case. 298

293. Huston (May 18, 1954), supra note 282, at 1.
294. See id. (mentioning that Mr. Banning E. Whittington, the press officer of
the court, was said to have notified the reporters of the reading of the decision).
295. See id. (explaining that South Carolina and Georgia had announced such
plans).
296. See Associated Press, 5 of 9 Justices Named by President Roosevelt, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 15.
297. Id.
298. Id.

426

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 (2020)
3. Legal references to the Court in Parents Involved

Both the numeric emphasis and the narrative quality of the
Parents Involved coverage are more politically pitched. For
example, the New York Times story covering the grant of certiorari
includes nine “legal” references. 299 Of these, six are references to
the state and local laws under review or relevant to the state plans
at issue. 300 Two references were to Supreme Court precedent, and
one was to a federal desegregation order that applied to the
Kentucky school district whose eventual plan to replace federal
oversight was the basis for the constitutional challenge being
heard by the Court. 301 One reference was to the “Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.” 302 Specifically,
the reporter explained that the Seattle integration plan had been
challenged in the Washington State Supreme Court, and that the

299. See David Stout, Justices to Rule on Race and Education, N.Y. TIMES
(June 5, 2006), https://perma.cc/4MF9-BAC8 (last visited Nov. 6, 2019)
(discussing issues concerning “affirmative action” and “racial gerrymandering”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Times’s coverage of
Parents Involved was handled by two different reporters—Linda Greenhouse, the
Times’s regular Supreme Court correspondent, and Continuous News
Correspondent David Stout. According to Stout, his role was to produce quick copy
for the Times’s online services while beat reporters like Linda Greenhouse worked
on stories that would eventually appear in the print edition, during a period when
the paper was striving for an effective marriage between its streaming and daily
services. Stout has described his version of stories about Supreme Court opinions
as “quicker, and therefore less detailed” than those that eventually appeared in
the print edition. Talk to the Newsroom: Continuous News Correspondent, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2008), https://perma.cc/8MKG-82QX (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). We have used two Stout stories
and one Greenhouse story as “narrative” examples of the Times’s coverage of
Parents Involved. All Stout stories and all Greenhouse stories on the case were
included in the universe of “primary coverage” of Parents Involved, meaning that
the data discussed in Part III.A represent the full complement of “legal” and
“political” references in both reporters’ stories.
300. Stout (June 5, 2006), supra note 299.
301. See id. (noting that the other reference was to the holding of Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which permitted colleges and universities to take
race into account, albeit in a limited way, in the context of student admissions
decisions).
302. Id.
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state court had found the plan permissible under state law and the
Federal Constitution. 303
In the coverage of the Parents Involved oral argument, we
found eighteen “legal” references. 304 Of these, thirteen were
references to or explanations of the integration plans being
challenged. 305 Three “legal” references were to Court precedent.
Specifically, the reporter stated that the cases being argued
“generated high interest, since they reached the court three years
after the tribunal upheld, 5–4, a racially conscious admissions plan
used at the University of Michigan Law School.” 306 He also said
that “the majority opinion in that case, Grutter v. Bollinger, was
written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who has since retired
and been replaced by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., who is considered
more conservative.” 307 Finally, after noting that Justice Kennedy
was identified by one of the parties as the swing vote in the case
under review, the reporter stated that “Justice Kennedy was one
of the four dissenters in the Michigan decision.” 308 The final two
“legal” references were to the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause. 309 Specifically, the reporter quoted the
attorney for the parents challenging the integration plan: “‘This
strikes at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause, which
commends that government treat people as individuals, not simply
303. See id.
The plan was upheld by the Washington State Supreme Court, which
found that it did not violate the state’s Civil Rights Act, as its
opponents argued. . . . But it was struck down by a three-judge panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit—and then
upheld by a 7-to-4 vote of that court, [the majority of which] concluded
that the Seattle plan was narrowly enough tailored that it did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution.
304. See David Stout, Supreme Court Case Focuses on Race and Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2006), https://perma.cc/6XB3-DEVL (last visited Nov. 7, 2019)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s “narrow tailoring” concern in relation to an “open
choice” school enrollment plan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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as members of a racial class,’ Mr. Korrell said, alluding to a section
of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.” 310
Finally, coverage of the decision in Parents Involved featured
twenty “legal” references. 311 Of these, eight were references to the
integration plans under review. 312 Another five were references to
the Constitution itself, including one to the “Constitution,” two to
the Constitution as “colorblind,” one to the “Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection,” and one to “the ‘narrow tailoring’
required to meet the equal protection demands of the 14th
Amendment.” 313 Finally, seven references were to Court
precedent. 314 The reporter made three references to Brown. 315 The
first described the “competing blocs of justices [in Parents United
both] claiming the mantle of Brown v. Board of Education.” 316 The
second described Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s statement
that his majority was “‘more faithful to the heritage of Brown,’ the
landmark 1954 decision that declared school segregation
unconstitutional.” 317 The third described dissenting Justice John
Paul Stevens as calling the Chief Justice’s “invocation of Brown v.
Board of Education . . . ‘a cruel irony’ when the [Chief Justice’s]
opinion in fact ‘rewrites the history of one of this court’s most
important decisions.’” 318 Apart from Brown, the story included two
references to the case of Bakke v. University of California Board of
Regents. 319 The reporter referred to the Bakke case in describing
Justice Kennedy’s vote with the majority as carrying a “special
resonance” because he
holds the seat once occupied by Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. who,
29 years ago to the day, announced his separate opinion in the
310.
311.

Id.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Diversity Plans in Two Districts, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2007), https://perma.cc/DG4Z-DCN9 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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Bakke case. That solitary opinion, rejecting quotas but
accepting diversity as a rationale for affirmative action in
university admissions, defined the law for the next 25 years. 320

The final reference to precedent came in the same discussion of
Justice Kennedy, where the reporter noted that Bakke was refined
and strengthened in “the University of Michigan Law School
decision,” from which Justice Kennedy dissented. 321 Notably, even
these references to “legal” drivers of the Court’s decision often
arose in the context of deconstructing the political coalition
building that had produced the split vote. 322
4. Political References to the Court in Parents Involved
The Times story on the grant of certiorari in Parents Involved
included thirteen “external political” references. 323 Eleven of those
references introduced or quoted representatives from third-party
advocacy groups such as the Pacific Legal Foundation or the
NAACP. 324 Two references were to a law professor. 325 The
quotations from these individuals are instructive. Law professor
Davison Douglas is quoted as saying that “the constitutionality of
affirmative action [is] looming in the background of this.” 326 Arthur
Mark of the Pacific Legal Foundation called the kind of plans
under review “racial gerrymandering.” 327
320. Greenhouse, supra note 311.
321. Id.
322. See, e.g., id. (“It was June of last year before the court, reconfigured by
the additions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, announced, over the
unrecorded but vigorous objection of the liberal justices, that it would hear both
appeals.”).
323. Stout (June 5, 2006), supra note 299.
324. See, e.g., id. (“Arthur B. Mark III, a lawyer for the Pacific Legal
Foundation, said the procedure amounts to ‘racial gerrymandering,’ and that the
victims are ‘students who are pulled from their local schools for no good reason.’”).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. It is worth noting, perhaps, that the number of non-governmental
organizations has greatly increased since the time of Brown, and that law
professors (and others) undoubtedly see the opportunity to gain national visibility
by providing commentary to be a more important part of their jobs than
previously was the case. Some years ago, it was widely reported that one law
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Coverage of the Parents Involved oral argument included one
“internal political” reference and five “external political”
references. 328 The internal political reference mentioned Justice
Alito as the replacement for retired Justice O’Connor and as being
“more conservative” than Justice O’Connor had been. 329 One
external political reference was to the Bush administration’s
alignment with parents challenging the integration plans. 330 The
remaining external political references all identified political
activists who either supported or opposed integration programs. 331
One such activist, the president of the Center for Individual
Rights, was quoted as saying that “[t]he court needs to put an end
to state-mandated tinkering with race.” 332
Coverage of the Parents Involved opinion featured two
“internal political” references. 333 The first explained that the
decision “came on the final day of the court’s 2006–2007 term,
which showed an energized conservative majority in control across
many areas of the court’s jurisprudence.” 334 The second noted that
the Justices originally agreed to hear the case “over the unrecorded
but vigorous objection of the liberal [J]ustices.” 335
Notably, the story featured no “external political” references
to third parties commenting on the outcome. 336 It is worth noting,
however, that a follow-up “News Analysis” the next day was
school professor had left student telephone calls unreturned but leapt at the
chance to speak with the press. See David Segal, He’s Here, He’s There, He’s
Everywhere on Air, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 1998), https://perma.cc/JVC6-83YP (last
visited Nov. 7, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
professor contested the accuracy of the story in a letter to the Post. See Jonathan
(Oct.
10,
1998),
Turley,
Just
Doing
My
Job,
WASH. POST
https://perma.cc/X59T-HAWV (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
328. Stout (Dec. 4, 2006), supra note 304.
329. Id.
330. See id. (noting that the administration agreed with parents who wished
to have the Seattle and Louisville programs struck down).
331. See id. (explaining that unnamed political demonstrators were
referenced in addition to named activists).
332. Id.
333. Greenhouse, supra note 311.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
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replete with such references. 337 In addition to two “internal
political” references (referring to the “four conservatives on the
court” and to the “four liberals”), the News Analysis story featured
twenty-four total third-party references. 338 Among the third
parties interviewed and quoted opining about Parents Involved
were two professors (Laurence Tribe and Charles Ogletree); three
attorneys who had worked on Brown (Judge Robert L. Carter,
Dean Jack Greenberg, and former Ford administration Secretary
of Transportation William T. Coleman Jr.); and one representative
of a political advocacy group, Roger Clegg of the Center for Equal
Opportunity, “a research group . . . that supports colorblind
government policies.” 339 Tribe said the split opinion represented
“two dramatically different visions . . . of the Constitution”;
Ogletree stated that the “hidden story” of the opinion was Justice
Kennedy’s reluctance to wholly dismantle Brown; and Greenberg
described the majority opinion as “preposterous.” 340 Only Clegg
spoke approvingly of the opinion. 341 The story concluded by quoting
Greenberg’s statement suggesting that the decision was not based
on the law, but on political factors: “You can’t really say that five
[J]ustices are so smart that they can read the law and precedents
and four others can’t, . . . [s]omething else is going on.” 342
This secondary story provides an interesting comparison to
the sidebar accompanying the Brown opinion story, which detailed
which Presidents had appointed which Justices. 343 Notably, this
337. Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES (June
29, 2007), https://perma.cc/E5QV-BY6R (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). This story was coded as “primary” coverage
because it appeared in the news pages of the paper and transmitted information
about the Court’s action in the case.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id. (“Roger Clegg, the president and general counsel of the Center for
Equal Opportunity, a research group in the Washington area that supports
colorblind government policies, disagreed, saying the majority honored history in
yesterday’s decision.”).
342. Id. Although our research did not attempt to measure whether “political”
references seemed to privilege any particular ideological point of view, in this
instance, at least, the reporter appeared to quote more liberally (so to speak), from
one point on the ideological spectrum.
343. Compare Liptak, supra note 337 (recounting various third-party
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“external political” follow-up to Parents Involved, 344 unlike the
“internal political” sidebar in the Times’s Brown coverage, 345 was
not limited to conveying verifiable factual information about the
Justices. Instead, the language of third parties is heavily charged
with value judgments about the plausibility and the political
genesis of the Parents Involved opinion, and its likely political
ramifications. 346
5. References to Individual Justices in Brown and Parents
Involved
A final distinction between the two cases provides additional
evidence of an enhanced “political” framing of Parents Involved as
compared to the primarily “legal” frame used to cover Brown. In
the entirety of the New York Times’s Brown coverage, individual
Justices were mentioned sixty times. 347 Most of these references
related that particular Justices had asked questions at oral
argument, with no attempt to characterize the question as
predictive of a particular result or consistent with any particular
political or judicial philosophy. 348
In comparison, there were sixty-two references to individual
Justices in the paper’s single-day coverage of the Parents Involved
opinion. 349 A close reading of these references seems to suggest

reactions to the Court’s decision in Parents Involved and discussing the
implications of these views), with Associated Press, supra note 296 (“Five of the
nine Supreme Court Justices who today outlawed race segregation in public
schools were appointees of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Three were named to
the Court by President Truman and one by President Eisenhower.”).
344. See Liptak, supra note 337 (analyzing commentary of third parties
involved in various policy groups).
345. See Associated Press, supra note 296.
346. See, e.g., id. (“‘The hidden story in the decision today is that Justice
Kennedy refused to follow the lead of the other four justices in eviscerating the
legacy of Brown,’ Professor Ogletree said.”).
347. See supra Part IV.B.1.c.
348. See supra Part IV.B.1.c; see also supra notes 246–247 and accompanying
text.
349. See supra Part IV.B.1.c.
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that judicial identity politics and intra-curial “horsetrading” are
more reliable indicators of case outcome than legal reasoning. 350
For example, references to Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote
the Court’s opinion, described him as defending “[h]is side of the
debate.” 351 In the same story, the Chief Justice’s “control” of the
Court is characterized as “not quite complete.” 352 A third reference
to Chief Justice Roberts explained that the Court had declined to
hear a challenge to a similar integration plan just months before
granting certiorari in Parents Involved. 353 The article noted that
the grant in Parents Involved occurred only after the Court had
been “reconfigured by the additions of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito,” and that it was “announced over the unrecorded but
vigorous objections of the liberal justices.” 354
Individual references to Justices Kennedy and Breyer also
added to the depiction of the Court as a partisan political
institution. 355 Justice Kennedy wrote separately in the case, so
that individual references to him were necessary to provide an
accurate and complete recounting of the contents of the opinions.
Many of the references explained that Justice Kennedy’s separate
opinion attempted to permit some “narrowly tailored” means of
accounting for race in the assignment of students to public schools
and was an effort to achieve some moderation in the application of
the majority opinion by school districts. 356
350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra Part IV.B.1.c.
Greenhouse, supra note 311.
Id.
See id.
The appeals provoked a long internal struggle over how the court
should respond. Months earlier, when Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
was still on the court, the [J]ustices had denied review in an appeal
challenging a similar program in Massachusetts. With no
disagreement among the federal appellate circuits on the validity of
such programs, the new appeals did not meet the criterion the court
ordinarily uses to decide which cases to hear. It was June of last year
before the court, reconfigured by the additions of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, announced, over the unrecorded but vigorous
objection of the liberal [J]ustices, that it would hear both appeals.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See Greenhouse, supra note 311 (“Justice Kennedy said achieving racial
diversity, ‘avoiding racial isolation’ and addressing ‘the problem of de facto
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However, in addition to these statements summarizing the
legal basis for Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the author also dwelled
on the power that Justice Kennedy enjoyed as a result of placing
himself at the ideological center of the Court. 357 The author noted
that the opinion was one of the last to be announced during the
Court term, and speculated that “[w]hat consumed the court
during the seven months the cases were under consideration, it
appears likely, was an effort by each side to edge Justice Kennedy
closer to its point of view.” 358 The author went on to note that “it is
hardly uncommon to find Justice Kennedy in the middle of the
court,” 359 and then stated that he “holds the seat once occupied by
Justice Lewis F. Powell, who [wrote a similarly limiting] separate
opinion in the Bakke affirmative action case.” 360 Finally, the author
noted that Justice Kennedy had dissented from the Court’s recent
cases upholding affirmative action plans, but “surprisingly” relied
on those cases in crafting his separate opinion. 361
These descriptions, while obviously informative, also may be
seen to carry political implications. For example, describing his
reliance on past cases with which Justice Kennedy disagreed as
“surprising” might suggest to the lay reader that Justices rarely
follow precedents with which they had personally disagreed when
they were handed down. 362 The article never explicitly identifies
resegregation in schooling’ were ‘compelling interests’ that a school district could
constitutionally pursue as long as it did so through programs that were
sufficiently ‘narrowly tailored.’”).
357. See id. (postulating that the reason for the seven month consideration of
the case was that each “side” of the Court tried to sway Justice Kennedy’s vote).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–324 (1978)
(Powell, J.) for Justice Powell’s analysis and reasoning in the plurality opinion
upholding the order that Mr. Bakke be admitted to the medical program and
placing a limit on the reach of special admissions programs based on race alone.
See also Sullivan, Power, supra note 50, at 1116–22 (discussing Justice Powell’s
opinion in Bakke).
361. See Greenhouse, supra note 311.
362. Of course, the dissents filed by various Justices have sometimes
expressed their intentions to adhere to the views they have expressed and to
refuse to follow the Court’s holdings in future cases. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I dissent from today's
decision, and, until § 3501 is repealed, will continue to apply it in all cases where
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Justice Kennedy’s appointing President, political party, or
ideology. 363 Nevertheless, the references contained in the article
may be viewed as reinforcing an image of the Court as an entity
engaged in strategic tactics and vote seeking. A description
grounded in political rhetoric is more often associated with the
political branches than with the ostensibly objective and
constrained judicial branch, and it is precisely this kind of
described behavior that has been shown most likely to diminish
public confidence in the Court. 364
References to Justice Breyer added a political valence to the
story, albeit one less concerned with strategy and vote seeking. 365
Again, given Justice Breyer’s position as the author of the main
dissenting opinion, 366 it is to be expected that a complete account
of the case would mention him individually. As was the case with
Justice Kennedy, however, the rhetorical choices made in
describing Justice Breyer’s actions are value-laden. For example,
the author noted that Justice Breyer spoke from the bench “for
more than 20 minutes,” and that he “made his points to a
courtroom audience that had never seen the coolly analytical
[J]ustice express himself with such emotion. His most pointed
words, in fact, appeared nowhere in his 77-page opinion.” 367 The
there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was
voluntary.”); Smith v. Hopper, 436 U.S. 950 (1978) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting their continued disagreement with
the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). More commonly, the
Justices tend to minimize the influence of precedents they deem to be uncongenial
by not citing them or by giving them a limiting construction, rather than by
asserting their illegitimacy. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Essay, Narrowing Precedent
in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1864–65 (2014) (discussing the
historical practice of Supreme Court “narrowing” and debunking the view that
this strategy is unique to the Roberts Court).
363. See Greenhouse, supra note 311.
364. See, e.g., Baird & Gangl, supra note 199, at 598 (comparing the positive
public perception resulting when the Court is described in an apolitical fashion
with the more critical lens through which citizens evaluate the political
branches).
365. See Greenhouse, supra note 311 (“In his written opinion, Justice Breyer
said the decision was a ‘radical’ step away from settled law . . . .”).
366. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in the
principal dissent. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
367. Greenhouse, supra note 311.
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article went on to describe Justice Breyer’s view that the opinion
was a “radical” departure from settled law, which would upset the
existing framework for public education in favor of a “disruptive
round of race-related litigation.” 368 Notably, the descriptions of
Justice Breyer’s dissent and his oral remarks did not refer to the
Constitution or legal doctrine as the basis for his disagreement
with the majority. 369
Finally, many of the individual references to Justices arose
during the author’s discussion of the changing composition of the
Court. For example, the author noted that the Court’s willingness
to hear challenges to public school integration plans seemed to
have shifted dramatically when Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor,
respectively. 370 The author also quoted Justice Stevens’s assertion
that “no member of the court [that Justice Stevens] joined in 1975
would have agreed with today’s decision” 371 and went on to note
that one of the members of that court was former Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for whom Chief Justice Roberts once clerked. 372
In sum, although the story included just two “internal
political” references, the many value-laden references to individual
Justices combined to signal to readers a view that the Court’s work
was heavily influenced by politics and intra-curial strategy
considerations. Undoubtedly, some such references were necessary
to produce an accurate account of the 5–4 split. But the language
used to describe each Justice’s voting background and
participation in the case emphasized intra-curial coalition building
as a major outcome determinant in salient cases. Few of the
descriptions of individual Justices described them as applying
objective legal principles to decide the case.
Perhaps the main question in the case was whether the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is to be found either in a
simple, categorical anti-classification principle, so that
classifications can never be made on the basis of race for any
reason or in any circumstances, or, alternatively, in an
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
Greenhouse, supra note 311.
Id.
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anti-subordination principle, which would allow some
considerations of race to be taken into account, for some purposes
and within certain limits, so long as it is not for the purpose of
subordinating a disadvantaged racial group. That would indeed
explain the seriousness of the split, but, unfortunately, there was
little discussion of that profound legal point in the press coverage.
D. Study Results—Discussion
The results of this study suggest that whereas the news media
at midcentury described the Court’s work in terms that were
primarily “legal,” the modern media has described the Court’s
work in political terms far more often than was previously the case.
Specifically, journalists increasingly characterize specific Justices
or voting blocs as “conservative” or “liberal”; allude to the Justices’
“ideology” in explaining their votes; and present case outcomes in
terms of the Justices’ respective presidential sponsors. In addition,
they increasingly rely on third-party outsiders aligned with
particular interest groups, who describe the case as a loss or
victory for their respective positions. 373 Finally, the increasing
practice of highlighting the positions of individual Justices and the
personal tensions amongst them also contributes to an impression
that Court decisions are more heavily influenced by who sits on the
bench than by “legal” factors. 374 Conversely, the ratio of “legal”
language to “political” language has declined substantially. The
Parents Involved journalists were less likely than their Brown
counterparts to refer to specific constitutional provisions,
doctrines, or precedents to explain judicial outcomes.
The picture of the Court that emerges from the work of the
Brown journalists is that of an essentially legal institution staffed
by technically skilled interpreters of the Constitution. This “legal”
373. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 337 (including commentary from five
third-party policy advocates in his discussion of Parents Involved).
374. In Brown, the ratio of “legal” to “internal” and “external” political
references was 1.79 to 1. In Parents Involved, the ratio was approximately 1 to 1.
If references to individual justices are included in the “political” category, the
legal to political ratios are 1.14 to 1 for Brown and .42 to 1 for Parents Involved.
See supra Part IV.B.
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depiction was sometimes leavened by acknowledgments that the
Justices also may have had to fall back on their individual life
experiences and interpretive archetypes to give meaning to
constitutional language that was opaque, outdated, or
indeterminate. 375 In other words, the Brown journalists were not
unduly simplistic or indifferent to “realism” in the judicial process,
but the primary frame for their coverage of the Court was legal.
The media of the 1950s presented the Court as an institution doing
law within an inescapably political system of government. The
Parents Involved journalists, by contrast, tended to depict the
Court in much more “political” terms. Their narratives represented
the Court as a site where individuals are not simply concerned
with law, but where they also bargain and converge to advance
their political preferences. This “political” depiction alluded to the
legal posture of particular cases, but it did not treat law as a
primary driver of judicial decision-making. 376
Social science research suggests that Americans are able to
appreciate the Court’s work at a fairly sophisticated level. 377 When
asked to choose between extreme “legal” models of decision-making
and extreme “political” models of decision-making, respondents
repeatedly report a preference for “legal” decision-making. 378
However, they have also demonstrated an understanding that the
Justices will sometimes need to supplement inconclusive or
multilayered texts with reference to interpretive methodologies,
personal values, and even policy-infused belief systems, thus
expressing approval for the model we call “principled
375. See supra notes 289–297 and accompanying text.
376. Two related caveats may be in order. First, it seems obvious that the
Court was perceived to be a more “political” institution in 2007 than it was in
1954. If that perception is correct, some of the modern shift towards political
framing may reflect changes in the Court as well as in the media. At the same
time, the media’s development of a popular political narrative of the Court may
have contributed to the conditions that facilitated the presumed politicization of
the institution. This leads to a second caveat: we are not claiming a causal
connection between media framing and the presumed politicization of the Court.
At most, we are observing that social science literature suggests a correlation
between political framing and public perceptions of procedural unfairness, which
in turn may be related to diminished “loyalty” to the Court; our study simply
supplies data that shows a rise in the comparative frequency of political framing.
377. See supra Part II.B.
378. See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
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discretion.” 379 Americans have simultaneously indicated that they
will withdraw their loyalty to the Court as an institution when
they perceive its members to be following a “political”
decision-making model. 380 Although the surveys that reflect these
preferences are often somewhat ambiguous concerning the line
between permissible judicial “discretion” and disfavored judicial
“politics,” respondents appear to be disapproving when judges
seem to be acting as “politicians in robes” or to be serving the
agendas of an exogenous partisan apparatus. 381
In other words, the public prefers judicial decision-making in
a “pure legal” model, is not uncomfortable with a “law-leaning”
model in which personal and policy values play a role, and rejects
a “politics-leaning” model. Based on these findings, one might
conclude that media coverage of the Court’s work does not have the
power to threaten public loyalty so long as it includes both law and
politics, mollifying readers with evidence that the Court’s work is
influenced by both internal and external factors. And one might
further argue that so long as stories about the Court refer to both
law and politics, it matters little if journalists emphasize one
aspect more than the other.
But we think it does matter. First, some of the increase in
“political” language that we found may suggest to the public that
the Justices are influenced by precisely the kind of non-legal
considerations that the public considers particularly offensive.
Specifically, the public has indicated that while it tolerates judicial
infusion of law with some personal values and policy preferences,
it does not believe that the Justices should mimic the preferences
of partisan groups outside the Court in its decision-making. 382 The
modern convention of interviewing and quoting representatives of
third-party interest groups—a relatively insignificant part of the
Brown coverage—may give readers the impression that the
Justices are themselves concerned with deciding cases to satisfy or
379. See supra Part II.A.3.
380. See supra notes 159–171 and accompanying text.
381. See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 60, at 208 (reporting that while a slim
majority of Americans do not think judges are “politicians in robes,” those who do
are more skeptical of the judicial decision-making process).
382. See supra notes 113–174 and accompanying text.
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align with those groups. 383 Similarly, the public has indicated its
distaste for intra-curial bargaining that resembles congressional
logrolling. 384 And the modern practice of describing how individual
Justices behave during oral argument and on decision days may
reinforce the image that the Justices are doing just that. 385
Second, without regard to whether the political language used
by the modern media reinforces the tropes that most repel the
public, the relatively greater amount of political language,
compared to legal language, is significant. Media framing theory
suggests that in a “competitive environment,” where multiple issue
frames are offered to the public, the sheer numeric dominance of a
particular frame has great persuasive force. 386 In other words,
when political explanations for the Court’s behavior equal or
exceed the number of legal explanations within a given story,
readers are likely to believe that political considerations are the
primary driver of the Court’s decision. That result has the
demonstrated capacity to undermine public confidence in the
Court, which is a structurally crucial resource when the Court acts
in a counter-majoritarian fashion.
A politics-leaning frame of the Court’s work is problematic for
a third reason. Media experts have learned that news stories with
“human interest” elements penetrate the public consciousness
more deeply than stories that are complex and abstract. 387 Political
explanations that boil down to liberal-conservative or
Democratic-Republican divides among the Justices are dramatic,
and easy for readers to understand. Explanations of “legalistic”
decision-making, replete with references to competing or
383. Compare, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 296, with Greenhouse, supra
note 311 (distinguishing the modern practice of including commentary from
policy-focused interest groups from the 1950s when policy groups were rarely
included in coverage of major court decisions).
384. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text.
385. Cf. Greenhouse, supra note 311 (describing Justice Breyer’s atypically
emotional delivery of his dissent).
386. See Chong & Druckman, supra note 188, at 111 (enumerating factors
that influence how individuals evaluate the strength of a frame including a
competitive environment).
387. See DORIS GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 90 (2d ed. 1984)
(hereinafter MASS MEDIA) (stating that in coverage of “serious” stories, “[c]omplex
issues are presented as simple human interest dramas”).
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conflicting constitutional provisions or to less than conclusive case
law, make for dry and sometimes challenging reading. 388
Consequently, there is good reason to believe that when readers
encounter a story that emphasizes politics and mentions law—or
even one that gives equal weight to both—the combined dominance
and dramatic resonance of political storytelling will drown out
legal language. 389 In other words, the mere presence of legally
framed information may not be sufficient to convince readers that
legal reasoning actually plays a meaningful role in the Court’s
work. 390 In contrast, when readers encounter a story that
emphasizes law and mentions politics, the dominance of legal
references combined with the drama of political references
increases the likelihood that readers will retain both accounts of
388. See Greenhouse, Story, supra note 185, at 1538 (“[E]very
generalization . . . about the barriers to public understanding of the judicial
system is particularly true of the Court: To the public at large, the Supreme Court
is a remote and mysterious oracle that makes occasional pronouncements on
major issues . . . and then disappears from view . . . .”).
389. For example, the Times reported in the same story that Justice Kennedy
wrote a separate concurrence in Parents Involved, urging the use of a “narrowly
tailored” local measure to take race into account in pupil assignments; the article
also discussed at length Justice Kennedy’s penchant for inflating his power by
staking out centrist positions that required his colleagues to court him throughout
the term prior to the resolution of divisive cases. See Greenhouse, supra note 311.
These linguistic and thematic choices can be described as “good” reporting
because they explain both the constitutional doctrine that allows for some
consideration of race and the manner in which Justice Kennedy tried to shift the
doctrinal discussion towards the moderate policy outcome which he preferred and
obviously thought to be more consistent with the Court’s existing jurisprudence,
particularly Bakke and Bollinger. At the same time, when the political account
occupies many more column inches than the legal account, and is rendered in
more vivid, accessible language, it could also be described as “bad” reporting
because it is likely that the reader will uptake only the political explanation of
Justice Kennedy’s work. Ideally, a reporter would attempt to explain Justice
Kennedy’s legal gambit in equally digestible language, and at equal length. And
an outstanding story might endeavor to document whether the legal doctrines
invoked by the various voting blocs plausibly justified their eventual votes in the
case, thus treating law and judgment as a complex hybrid rather than mutually
exclusive choices. That may be difficult, of course, given the time constraints
under which contemporary reporters labor, together with the Court’s seeming
unwillingness to adopt any measures that might help reporters to improve their
coverage of the Court, as some courts in other countries have done. See supra
notes 205–207 and accompanying text.
390. See, e.g., Chong & Druckman, supra note 216, at 111.
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the Court’s work. 391 Thus, a law-leaning portrayal that includes
political context is more likely than its opposite to convey that the
Court typically honors both factors internal to the law and some
external to it.
V. Ramifications
In 2010, Christopher Johnston and Brandon Bartles wrote
that the media “empties the ‘reservoir of goodwill’ that the courts
have enjoyed” over the years, and thereby diminishes support for
the Supreme Court, as media coverage leans towards “greater
sensationalism, derogating judges, [and] highlighting political
decision-making.” 392 By focusing on the press’s reporting of Brown
and Parents Involved, our study suggests the possibility that a
strong shift in the nature of Supreme Court reporting has occurred
since the 1950s. It is a shift that de-emphasizes the legal aspects
of Supreme Court decision-making, the reporting of which
naturally requires a substantial reservoir of legal knowledge and
much attention to the detail of individual cases, in favor of a kind
of reporting that emphasizes non-legal aspects of the
decision-making process, which are less difficult to understand and
may give rise to a more lively narrative. In other words, the
conditions that scholars have identified as constituting a threat to
continued support for the Court as an institution seem to be
present. 393 Whether the diminution in public support for the Court
that Johnston and Bartles have predicted will come to pass
391. See id. (stating that “framing effects depend on a mix of factors including
[both] the strength and [the] repetition of the frame . . . [and that] the aggregate
impact of a mix of frames may differ from sum of their individual effects.” As a
result, when a strong (political) frame is competing with an infrequently repeated
weak (legal) frame, the strong frame might be expected to win, but when a strong
(political) frame is itself infrequent and is competing with a frequently repeated
but weak (legal) frame, the two might be expected to make equally significant
impressions on a reader).
392. Christopher D. Johnston & Brandon L. Bartles, Sensationalism and
Sobriety: Differential Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward American Courts, 74
PUB. OPINION Q. 260, 276 (2010).
393. See Johnston & Bartles, supra note 392, at 276 (predicting “deleterious
consequences” for the public’s opinion of the judiciary if the media continue to
portray the court in political terms).
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remains to be seen, but the snapshots provided by recent polls
strongly suggest that that may well be the case.
Our goal has been to test the possibility that media framing of
the Supreme Court’s work has shifted. We have not undertaken to
explain the reason for that shift. However, scholars of framing
have suggested that frames serve multiple purposes: (1) they allow
journalists to structure their work and quickly synthesize
incoming information; (2) they allow individual journalists or
outlets to examine information in terms of its relevance to the
political commitments of the author or publisher; and (3) they
reflect the views of external actors such as politicians, interest
groups, and other elites who may be sources for an individual story
or recognized experts on a broad topic. 394 The shift away from the
relative dominance of legal framing serves all three of these
purposes.
First, a political frame provides an easy structure for
journalists. As the news cycle has evolved from a daily to an hourly
rhythm, 395 reporters are expected to digest the content of Court
opinions almost instantaneously, rather than taking several hours
between a morning opinion announcement and an evening
deadline to read the various opinions in each case in which a
decision has been rendered, digest the fine points of the legal
reasoning contained in those opinions, and translate the legal
concepts discussed in the several opinions into readable prose. 396
Identifying a case outcome, the vote breakdown, and the political
“winner” is a far faster and simpler task than working through, in
an exceedingly short period of time, the legal analyses in what may
be a lengthy set of opinions, determining what the Justices are
actually saying in their opinions, what the real nature of their
disagreement is, and drafting a comprehensible story for lay
394. See Scheufele, supra note 189, at 107–111 (defining the concept of
“frames,” suggesting a typology for framing, and analyzing the effect of framing
in the consumption of modern media).
395. See Christopher Bergland, How Has News Changed Over the Past 30
Years?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/RQ8B-SN3B (last
visited Oct. 16, 2019) (documenting changes in the way news is reported against
the backdrop of technological advances) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
396. See id. (asserting that reporting may have become more subjective, as
the American news cycle has become almost instantaneous).
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readers in terms of the legal sources that have been cited. This is
especially true as the Supreme Court press corps has shrunk and
general assignment reporters have been asked to cover important
opinion announcements as soon as they break. 397 It is also
especially true in the final weeks of the Supreme Court Term,
when a large number of important opinions in particularly difficult
cases are released together on a small number of opinion days. 398
Finally, it is especially true when the Court, unlike some other
constitutional courts, has decided to provide very little assistance
to help journalists understand the Court and its work.
Second, some individual journalists and particular news
outlets have become increasingly candid and straightforward
about their own political commitments. 399 Indeed, the prominence
of certain individual journalists and the success of certain news
outlets may depend on the loyalty of a particular segment of the
news-consuming public, so that casting Court opinions as victories
or defeats for viewpoints favored by their readers may be a
particularly appealing approach to coverage. 400 This factor has
obviously increased in importance in recent years as the economics
of publishing has put greater and greater pressure on the print
news industry. 401
397. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Story, supra note 185, at 1540–41 (describing the
changing landscape of reporting at the Supreme Court and lamenting the loss of
understanding of the workings of the Court as news outlets have scaled back their
full-time presence at the Court).
398. See id. at 1549–50 (highlighting certain landmark decisions that received
very little press coverage because the reporters were faultlessly ignorant of their
legal significance); see also id. at 1548–49 (“[A]lthough it would certainly be
rewarding to have behind-the-scenes discussions with the Justices about the
Court’s work, there is a certain liberation in not having the kind of personal,
mutually beneficial relationships that many political journalists have with the
people they cover.”).
399. See, e.g., S. Robert Lichter, Theories of Media Bias in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 7 (2017) (discussing a “shift toward
more partisan news,” the “development of avowedly partisan electronic media
organs,” and a “tendency in recent years for news outlets to become more
opinionated”).
400. See, e.g., AMY MITCHELL ET AL., POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND MEDIA
HABITS 22–24 (PEW RES. CTR. 2014) (analyzing data collected regarding public
perception of popular news outlets and demonstrating that consumers tend to
prefer news outlets that are aligned with their ideological views).
401. See, e.g., Impartiality—The Foxification of News, THE ECONOMIST (July
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Third, reporters seeking expert assistance and commentary
may be drawn into an assumption that the Court’s work is largely
political, as that may well be the view of those to whom they are
most likely to go for expert help. 402 This trend may continue as the
number of interest groups filing policy-oriented amicus curiae
briefs in Supreme Court litigation has grown exponentially, 403
strikingly similar to the operations of lobbying groups in relation
to the executive and legislative branches. Moreover, legal scholars
and other prominent lawyers increasingly have publicly identified
themselves with various ideological and political positions, 404 and
they often compete to advance those positions using a media
platform. Finally, the legal academy has arguably shifted from
formalism to various forms of “realism,” 405 so that journalists
seeking academic legal sources are more likely to receive “realist”
explanations of the Court’s work.
7, 2011), https://perma.cc/AQ42-5J4S (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (evaluating the
hyper-partisan impact that technology has had on news outlets) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
402. For one reporter’s experience covering the Supreme Court and her
observations on the ramifications of not properly educating reporters on the legal
aspect of the Court’s work, see generally Greenhouse, Story, supra note 185.
403. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 244, at 828–30 (concluding that the
number of amicus curiae briefs has increased to previously unprecedented levels
while casting some doubt on the actual legal effect of briefs filed by policy groups
as opposed to state actors).
404. For one detailed analysis of the ideology of American lawyers that
outlines the general political leanings of the legal profession, geographic ideology,
the relationship of a legal professional’s educational background and ideology, the
ideology of law firms, and the ideology of legal professionals by practice area, see
generally ADAM BONICA, ADAM S. CHILTON, & MAYA SEN, THE POLITICAL
IDEOLOGIES OF AMERICAN LAWYERS (HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 2015).
405. It is also the case, of course, that some Supreme Court journalists are
themselves either law graduates or journalists who have received special legal
training, often in special programs at Harvard or Yale. As of 2005, for example,
Yale Law School had enrolled “over 120 talented mid-career journalists in a
one-year program of intensive legal studies culminating in the Master of Studies
in Law degree. Scores of graduates of the school have gone on to fill the daily
airwaves, newspapers, and websites, including such well-known and diverse
journalists as Jeff Greenfield, Linda Greenhouse, Ben Stein, Steven Brill, and
Jeffrey Rosen.” Harold Koh, Yale Law School, Lex et Veritas, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Feb.
2005) https://perma.cc/V72B-EWGH (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Yale has long been at the forefront of legal
realism. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960 (G.
Edward White ed., 1986).
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In addition to the structural and environmental factors that
may have drawn reporters towards political framing, the sociology
(as well as the economics) of journalism has shifted since the time
of Brown. In the post-Watergate years, the press increasingly saw
itself as standing in an adversarial position with respect to many
institutions, obliged to discredit surface explanations and seek
“behind-the-scenes” truth. 406 For example, Bob Woodward applied
the same techniques used in his Watergate coverage to write the
first “exposé” of the Supreme Court in 1979, 407 and other reporters
have periodically followed suit with additional books that claim to
lay bare the true personality and ideological struggles that
seemingly beset the Court. 408 It is also the case, of course, that the
Supreme Court has provided more fertile ground for such inquiries
in recent years, as the Court has sometimes reached out to decide
cases in derogation of its ordinary norms, as it did most notably in
Bush v. Gore; 409 and as some of the Justices’ treatment of each
other in opinions and at oral argument has come under scrutiny. 410
406. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 168 (1978).
407. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT (1979) (offering a look “behind-the-scenes” at the inner workings
of the Court from 1969 to 1975 including a critique of various Justices and a
discussion of their personalities).
408. See generally JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE
INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE SUPREME COURT (Penguin
Press 2007); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (2008); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE
AND THE SUPREME COURT (2013).
409. 531 U.S. 98, 103–04 (2000) (per curiam) (deciding the outcome of the
2000 presidential election by overruling the Florida courts on a question of
Florida state law, contrary to the Court’s practice of not deciding state law issues,
and stating, contrary to accepted norms, that the Court’s decision should not be
treated as precedent for other cases); see also Margaret Moses, Beyond Judicial
Activism: When the Supreme Court is No Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 161, 174–75, 202 (2011) (calling into question the Supreme Court’s recent
practice of “reaching out” to decide issues not properly presented by analyzing the
Court’s consideration of four recent cases and questioning whether the Court was
acting legitimately in its treatment of those cases); Linda Greenhouse, Can the
Supreme Court Save Itself?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2019, at SR3 (discussing the
politically-charged cases being presented to the Court in the current Term and
the challenges they represent for the Court’s credibility and reputation for
political independence).
410. See Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as
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Why does it matter if the press persuades the public—even
inadvertently—that legal reasoning is a chimera in Supreme Court
decision-making? It is a commonplace that governmental power in
a constitutional democracy must be exercised “within the law.” 411
Citizens are therefore likely to consider adjudication legitimate
when they “have respect for the [Court’s] reasons, not agreement
with [its] results.” 412 Translating the Court’s reasoning about text
and precedent into understandable language is difficult, and
journalists may appear less committed to the task today than they
were decades ago. Increasingly, journalists merely allude to text
and caselaw within extended political deconstructions of the
Justices’ work. Such allusions do not help readers understand the
Justices’ explanations of their reasoning or their votes. To the
contrary, they insulate citizen readers from an understanding of
the complexities inherent in judicial decision-making in a
constitutional democracy. These allusions invite the public to infer
that when it comes to the Supreme Court, results are reasons.
This, in turn, suggests that Supreme Court adjudication is not a
legitimate act of judicial review according to law, but an
anti-democratic usurpation by a life-tenured, unelected body.
Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 1168–78 (2019) (characterizing the “new
oral argument” as more adversarial and rife with commentary from the Justices
than traditional practice); Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted:
The Effect of Gender, Ideology and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments,
103 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1485 (2017) (noting the frequency with which the Justices
interrupt counsel and each other during oral arguments); Sullivan & Canty, supra
note 32, at 1037; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 1715 (criticizing certain
Justices for using sarcasm and ridicule in their opinions).
411. STEVEN BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH xi (1992) (explaining that a
court’s ethical duty to uphold the law is critical and should not be taken for
granted). See also STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 95 (2000) (“No one is
expected to believe . . . [that the Supreme Court’s] decisions are infallibly just in
matters of substance; but everybody is expected to believe [that the] procedures
are just because they conform to the basic principle governing adversary
reasoning: . . . both sides in a conflict should be equally heard.”); TOM BINGHAM,
THE RULE OF LAW 90–91 (2010) (noting the elements of fairness in
decision-making, including judicial independence); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on
the Constitutionality of a National Bank, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 416
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (“To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus
specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a
boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”).
412. BURTON, supra note 412, at xii.
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The proper role of the press certainly is not to hide the truth
about the Court, artificially inflate its claims to legitimacy, or
present a romanticized picture of judicial review. The opposite is
true. The press’s role is to inform and educate a free and
self-governing people, and that necessarily includes subjecting the
Court’s work to careful scrutiny to determine whether the reasons
the Justices give for their decisions are valid and legitimate. 413 The
fact is, of course, that whether the Justices decide cases primarily
according to law is fiercely contested, with many political scientists
and some lawyers firmly convinced that they do not. Indeed, the
evidence strongly suggests that the Justices who have been
selected in the recent past have been nominated and confirmed
primarily because those responsible for the nomination and
confirmation processes were convinced that the nominees would
decide cases precisely as their political sponsors hoped. 414 Some,
indeed, have barely concealed their partisan stripes in the course
of their confirmation hearings, no doubt reacting to what they have
considered to be unfair partisan treatment meted out by those on
the other side of the aisle. 415
413. See, e.g., Joe Concha, The Washington Post: “Democracy Dies in
Darkness”, THE HILL (Feb. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/37EZ-85X6 (last visited Oct.
17, 2019) (discussing the Washington Post’s adoption of a new editorial motto
emphasizing the indispensable role of the press in a democratic system that
presumes citizen engagement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 633–34 (1975) (stating
Justice Stewart’s view that the existence of a free press is indispensable to the
constitutional design).
414. See Robert Barnes, Justices Tend to Agree with Presidents that Pick
POST
(Dec.
20,
2015),
Them—But
Stray
Later,
WASH.
https://perma.cc/3BU7-F5YG (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (“Most members of the
court make more decisions favorable to the president who brought them to the
dance than they do to subsequent presidents . . . . [T]he ‘loyalty effect’ is evident
even when other factors such as ideology and a personal relationship with the
appointing president are taken into account.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
415. Cf. Tom Donnelly & Brianne Gorod, None to the Right of Samuel Alito,
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/V8FD-2NRE (last visited Oct. 17,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
When Justice Samuel Alito was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court
by President George W. Bush 10 years ago, it represented a triumph
for the conservative legal movement. Haunted for decades by the
ghosts of Supreme Court nominees they found disappointing—most
notably, David Souter and Anthony Kennedy—conservatives finally
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If the Justices profess to be making decisions according to law,
however, the best way to prove or disprove that claim is to
scrutinize their opinions to determine whether that is what they
are doing, rather than merely assuming that law does not enter
into the Justices’ decision-making process except, perhaps, as
window dressing. While the work of the contemporary press seems
to have been increasingly influenced by the “political” account of
the Court, it seems to have adopted that normative view without
explicitly acknowledging to its readers the bias it represents.
Gravitating towards a political frame for Court decision-making
leaves the public with an understanding of the judiciary that is
dangerously incomplete (at best) and biased (at worst). It is worth
asking whether—given complete freedom to describe and explain
the Court’s work as they wish—reporters are making choices that
help to educate Americans about their Constitution and its role in
modern life, or, alternatively, choices that depict the Court as
exerting power “outside the law.” It is also worth asking what has
motivated those choices. One explanation, as we have noted, may
be found in the extreme time constraints under which reporters
and editors now typically work, together with the fact that really
getting to the bottom of Supreme Court opinions is hard work and
extremely time-consuming. On the other hand, to the extent that
political framing reflects an effort either to win market edge by
generating quick stories or to advance a reporter’s own political
commitments, those choices are not consistent with the press’s
stated mission of contributing to the democratic process by
providing citizens with accurate and objective information about
important matters of civic life.
Real consequences flow from these framing practices. In the
short term, studies indicate, rising perceptions of the Court as a
politically motivated institution correlate with falling perceptions
of the Court as an institution worthy of deference or protection.
When the public lacks confidence in the Court, whether reasonably
and justifiably or not, serious consequences may follow, as was the
had their man. As the law professor Jonathan Turley noted when Alito
was nominated, “No one on the conservative base can be unhappy with
Sam Alito.” A decade into his tenure on the Court, Alito hasn’t
disappointed.
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case on various past occasions when segments of the community
have opposed the authority of Court decrees, most notably in the
enforcement of equitable orders flowing from the Brown decision
and its progeny, 416 and more recently in the refusal of state
officeholders to comply with the Court’s same-sex marriage
decisions. 417
Reporting that has the effect of unduly encouraging the public
to view the Supreme Court and its work through the prism of
politics may also have a more far-reaching, albeit more diffuse,
consequence. The American project creates space for both
constitutionalism and democracy, 418 and it draws strength from
416. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 27, at 94–98 (2015) (using the story of
Sherriff Tom Poppell in McIntosh County, Georgia to illustrate the serious
problems that arise when authority acts outside legitimate grants of power or
with less than savory motivations).
417. See Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial Process and the
Last Stand Against Marriage Equality in the Land of George Wallace, 110 NW. U.
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3–13 (2015) (explaining the procedure for issuing marriage
licenses in Alabama and how individual judges circumvented law to achieve
desired political outcomes). Recent refusals to obey court orders have not been
limited to state officials or highly controversial cultural issues. In one recent case,
the federal government simply ignored the mandate of a federal appellate court,
choosing instead to follow the Attorney General’s legal interpretation, which
provoked a strong response from the court on a subsequent appeal. See
Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, No. 19-1642 (7th Cir., Jan, 23, 2020) (Easterbrook J.)
What happened next beggars belief. The Board of Immigration Appeals
wrote, on the basis of a footnote in a letter the Attorney General wrote
after our opinion, that our decision is incorrect. Instead of addressing
the issues we specified, the Board repeated a theme of its prior decision
that the Secretary has the sole power to issue U visas and therefore
should have the sole power to decide whether to waive
inadmissibility. . . . In sum, the Board flatly refused to implement our
decision.
See also Adrienne Mahsa Varkiani, Will CBP Get Away With Deporting an
Iranian Student Against a Court Order?, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://perma.cc/QFE8-BYJK (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (describing case in which
the government deported a student, notwithstanding court order and
representations apparently made to the court by government lawyers) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
418. See Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 399,
399–400 (1998) (identifying the tension between democracy and constitutionalism
as a constant struggle for Justices to balance politics and the black letter law); see
also Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
3 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (explaining differences between
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the tension between them. 419 Democracy is predicated upon a faith
in human nature and involves majority rule: “the people of a
country deciding for themselves the contents of laws that organize
and regulate their political association” in real time. 420
Constitutionalism, on the other hand, is based on a distrust of
majority rule and a belief that restraints must be placed even on
the majority; decisions by the people must be limited by a
“supervening . . . law of lawmaking” that takes the long view. 421
The American system of government fuses these potentially
conflicting elements into an integrated whole, giving full-throated
voice to both parts. With respect to the role of the Court in this
mixed system of government, Americans have repeatedly
expressed their tolerance for legally reasoned decisions with which
they strongly disagree; that is, for constitutionalism. 422 And they
repeatedly have expressed their distaste for politically based
judicial decisions regardless of outcome; that is, for what they
believe to be judicial usurpation of democracy. 423 Citizens
intuitively grasp the symbiotic relationship between these two
ideals. When they suspect that the Court is upsetting the balance
between the two, they may struggle to support the most
“constitutionalist” branch of government, or the text that claims
authority to restrain the majority in the service of long-term ideals.
Constitutions “articulate, preserve, or construct the highest values
of the nation and its people” 424 and “protect the demos from

constitutionalism and democracy and their fusion).
419. See Barry Sullivan, The Irish Constitution: Some Reflections From
Abroad, in THE IRISH CONSTITUTION: GOVERNANCE AND VALUES 1, 3 (Oran Doyle &
Eoin Carolan eds., 2008) (“Virtually all [constitutions] create some framework for
government, identify rights, and, in one way or another, give voice to the nation’s
aspirations as to what kind of a people the nation wishes to be.”); Mila Versteeg,
Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L.J. 1133, 1136–37 (2014) (stating that the
role of a constitution is to instill high-minded goals and codify a society’s values
while ordinary legislation serves to further short-term interests).
420. Michelman, supra note 418, at 400.
421. See id. (describing the how the high ideals of a constitution should
interact with popular opinion and sentiments in moments of tension).
422. See supra notes 161–168 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 169–173 and accompanying text.
424. Versteeg, supra note 419, at 1135.
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itself.” 425 If the public’s loyalty to the Constitution evaporates, the
search for shared values may well evaporate with it.
VI. Conclusion
To be sure, the work of judges eludes simplistic description.
While lawyers and political scientists have occasionally tried to
distill the work of judges to “legal” or “political” models, neither
model can account for the whole story. Americans seem to grasp
that fact and understand that constitutional adjudication requires
the exercise of judgment and choice, as well as scholarly and
dispassionate attention to the sources of law. And Americans
mainly seem to accept that discretion is essential to the judicial
process, so long as it is exercised within acknowledged and
accepted bounds. But when Americans perceive that claims of
judgment or discretion are simply a cover for political
decision-making, their trust runs out. Consequently, when the
press emphasizes the legal aspects of judicial decisions, Americans
are more likely to support the institution, notwithstanding their
disagreement with individual decisions. On the other hand, they
are not inclined to do so when the press’s narrative suggests that
politics drives the Court. That is why the manner in which the
press chooses to describe the work of the Court is critical. The press
must hold the Court accountable. That is the necessary role of the
press in a democratic society. But the criteria that the press uses
to describe the Court’s work must also be fair, accurate, and
transparent. That is particularly true today, when there are
unmistakable signs that the courts are considered by many,
including those responsible for the nomination and confirmation of
judges and Justices, to be convenient institutions for achieving
political ends, rather than discharging their duty of “saying what
the law is,” albeit according to their own best, individual judgment.
This study of the conventions of Supreme Court reportage,
predicated on a comparison of the print media’s coverage of two
salient cases decided fifty years apart, suggests that journalists
may have shifted from telling a mainly legal story about the Court
to telling one that is largely political. Of course, two cases do not
425.

Id.
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prove the point, no matter how extensive and varied the reportage,
and the results of this study are necessarily provisional. Further
studies of the print media’s coverage of additional cases are
needed, and it would be helpful as well to study the non-print
media from which so many Americans now typically receive their
news. But the results of this limited study are striking. The
frequency and depth of references to the Constitution, precedents,
and other sources of law that was apparent in the press coverage
of Brown seem to have given way in Parents Involved to
discussions of such things as the Justices’ political pedigrees and
sponsors and the goals of external political groups.
Moreover, if one properly can generalize from these two cases,
it seems that the press has changed its approach to Supreme Court
reporting without acknowledging—to itself or the public—the
nature or possible consequences of that change. Press coverage
that tells an easily digestible but oversimplified story—depicting
the Justices either as mere technicians or as naked
politicians—will not enlighten the public; but coverage that treats
the Justices as mere political actors may well—and possibly
without adequate justification—undermine the public’s confidence
in the Court’s performance of its indispensable role in our
constitutional democracy. This study suggests that the press may
operate from the assumption that the Court is, above all, a locus of
political struggle. It is not clear whether that story is entirely true.
Whether it is true or not, however, it may well be self-fulfilling.

